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TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW* 
UNIFYING FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
William Wirt Blume** and Elizabeth Gaspar Brownt 
Part I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDARDIZED JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
THE United States first became a sovereign nation when indi-vidual states of the Confederation ceded to the states collectively 
their several interests in the lands west of the Appalachians which 
lay east of the Mississippi, north of Spanish Florida, and south of 
the Great Lakes. This area had been relinquished by Great Brit-
ain by the Treaty of 1783 and, with the exception of Kentucky, 
now became the property of the United States. It was the first area 
over which the states as a group had complete sovereignty, subject 
only to the claims of the various Indian tribes. Colonies fresh from 
success in a fight for freedom from colonialism thus soon found 
themselves a colonial power faced with the task of governing their 
own colonies. 
The first plan of government for the western area was drafted 
by Thomas Jefferson, and submitted to Congress on March l, 
1784.1 Under this plan the entire western territory was to be 
• Editor's Note.-For many years Professor William Wirt Blume has been engaged 
in a continuing study of a large collection of territorial court records deposited in the 
University of Michigan Law Library by the Michigan Historical Commission. A major 
product of this study was the publication of Transactions of the Supreme Court of the 
Territory of Michigan 1805-1836 (six volumes). In recent years five articles dealing 
with the development of territorial law have been published in this Review under 
titles referring generally to the legal history of the American frontier. In the course 
of his research and writing, Professor Blume has formed some tentative conclusions as 
to how American legal history may be approached. He has concluded that, following 
separate studies of the original colonies, a study of the laws and legal institutions of 
the territories as a group will serve to provide and be indicative of the feasibility of a 
unified approach to legal developments west of the original states. To demonstrate 
such an approach, Professor Blume, assisted by Research Associate Elizabeth Gaspar 
Brown, has written this two-part article, which includes: Part I. Establishment of a 
Standardized Judicial System, and Part II. Influences Tending To Unify Territorial Law. 
The first part of this two-part article is printed herewith. The second will appear in a 
subsequent issue of the Review. 
•• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
t Research Associate in Law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed. 
1 26 JOURNALS OF nu: CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 118 (Hunt ed. 1928). The plan was 
submitted by a committee composed of Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, Jeremiah Townley 
Chase of Maryland, and David Howell of Rhode Island. The committee report was in 
Jefferson's handwriting. 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408 (Ford ed. 1892). It is 
referred to as "his report." 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 581 (Boyd ed. 1950). 
[ 39] 
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divided into fourteen states.2 For purposes of temporary govern-
ment, the "free males of full age" within each of these states were 
to "adopt the constitution and laws" of some one of the original 
states, which would continue in force until the state should acquire 
20,000 free inhabitants, when they might establish "a permanent 
constitution and government for themselves." There would be 
no colonial governments, only temporary ·state governments fol-
lowed by permanent state governments.3 But upon consideration 
by Congress, it became evident that some form of colonial govern-
ment would have to precede the temporary state governments pro-
vided for in the plan,4 and on April 21, 1784, the following amend-
ment was proposed: 
"That till such time as the settlers aforesaid shall have 
adopted the constitution and laws of some one of the Original 
states as aforesaid, for a temporary government, the said 
settlers shall be ruled by magistrates to be appointed by the 
United States in Congress assembled, and under such laws and 
regulations as the United States in Congress assembled shall 
direct.''5 
Six of the eleven states voting on the motion favored its adoption, 
as did nineteen of the twenty-four individual delegates present and 
voting. Only one state voted "no," yet the motion was defeated. 
And it is of interest to note that the Virginia delegation, including 
Mr. Jefferson, voted "ay." 
Then, on April 23, 1784, another amendment was proposed: 
"That measures not inconsistent with the principles of the 
Confederation, and necessary for the preservation of peace 
2 See Jefferson-Hartley map in The William L. Clements Library, University of 
Michigan, reproduced in "Th. Jefferson," a pamphlet published by the Library in 1943. 
See also 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note l, at 592-93. 
3 In earlier drafts Jefferson had sketched the bounds of a "new" Northwest "colony" 
and of six "new" Northwest "Colonies." 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. 
supra note 1, at 600·01. In the plan submitted to Congress the term "colony" was not 
used. 
4 A revised report submitted to Congress, March 22, 1784, referred not merely to 
"territory ceded or to be ceded by individual states to the United States," but to so 
much thereof "as is already purchased or shall be purchased of the Indian inhabitants 
&: offered for sale by Congress. • • ." Instead of authorizing settlers "within any of 
the said states" to adopt a constitution, the revised plan gave this privilege to "settlers 
of any territory so purchased and offered for sale.'' 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
op. cit. supra note 1, at 607; 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note I, at 
429. 
5 26 JOURNALS OF THE CG>NTINENTAL CONGRESS 259 (Hunt ed. 1928). See also id. at 274. 
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and good order among the settlers of any of the new states, 
until they shall assume a temporary government as aforesaid, 
may from time to time, be taken by the United States in Con-
gress assembled."6 
41 
A motion to postpone consideration of this proposal in order to 
take up the amendment of April 21 was voted down. In this in-
stance the Virginia delegation, including Mr. Jefferson, voted "no." 
It has been suggested that Jefferson voted for the amendment 
proposed April 21 "possibly because he knew it would be de-
feated."7 Why he would do this is not suggested. That he preferred 
the language of April 23 to that of April 21 seems clear from his 
second vote, but it also seems clear that he recognized on April 21 
as well as on April 23 that some form of colonial rule would have 
to precede self-rule. Failure to refer to the Ordinance of 1784 in 
"his memoranda of the services which he took pride in having 
rendered his country, written in 1800" and in "his autobiography, 
written in 182 l "8 may be explained by the fact that his original 
plan was in fact unworkable and required amending. Even as 
amended, it "bore no fruit" 11 and was repealed in 1787. 
A new plan of a temporary government "for such districts as 
shall be laid out by the United States" was submitted to Congress 
May IO, 1786.10 This provided for the appointment by Congress 
of a governor, five councillors, a secretary, and "a court, to con-
sist of five members who shall have a common law and chancery 
jurisdiction, and whose commissions shall continue in force during 
good behavior." The draft recited that its object was to protect the 
persons and rights of those who might settle within such districts 
"in the infancy of their settlement"; that the United States looked 
forward "with equal anxiety" to the period at which temporary 
government should cease, and the settlers would be admitted "into 
the Confederacy" agreeably to the acts of cession. 
A revised plan submitted to Congress on July 13, 1786,11 omit-
ted the provision for councillors but retained that calling for the 
appointment of a court, changing "members" to "judges." The 
a Id. at 274. 
7 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 612 n.26. 
8 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 429 n.1. 
o LAws OF TIIE NORTHWEST TERlllTOllY 1788-1800, at xiii (Pease ed. 1925) [herein• 
after cited as P.1!:ASEJ. 
10 30 JOURNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 252 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1934). 
11 Id. at 403. 
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.provision for a court remained unchanged in the plan submitted 
September 19, 1786,12 but in the bill of April 26, 1787, as amended 
and ordered to a third reading on May 10, 1787, the provision 
read: 13 "There shall also be appointed a Court, to consist of three 
judges, any two of whom shall form a Court, who shall have a com-
mon law jurisdiction, whose commissions shall continue in force 
during good behavior." This amended provision appears in the 
Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787,14 accompanied by require-
ments that the judges "reside in the district and have each therein 
a freehold estate in five hundred acres of land while in the exercise 
of their offices." 
Under the plan as amended on April 26, I 787,15 the three 
judges, in addition to forming a court, were to join with the gover-
nor in adopting such laws of the original states as might be "nec-
essary and best suited to the circumstances of the district." In 
effect, as proposed by the amendment offered on April 21, 1784,16 
the settlers were to be "ruled by magistrates to be appointed by the 
United States in Congress assembled, and under such laws and 
regulations as the United States in Congress assembled shall direct." 
It should be noted, however, that this extreme form of colonial 
government was to be modified as soon as there should be five 
thousand "free male inhabitants, of full age" within the district, 
at which time the settlers might elect representatives to a general 
assembly. The second stage of colonial government was to end in 
statehood when any of the states should have "of free inhabitants 
as many as are equal in number to the one-thirteenth part of the 
citizens of the original states." The same two stages of colonial 
government were provided by the Northwest Ordinance of July 
13, 1787, the second stage to end when any of the proposed states 
should have sixty thousand "free inhabitants therein." 
LEGISLATIVE AGENCIES AND POWER 
Before examining some of the statutes which developed and 
established the territorial court system, it may be useful to have 
12 31 id. at 670. 
13 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 608 (Smith ed. 1882) [hereinafter cited as ST. CLAIR PA· 
PERS]. 
14 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a); 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF TIIE 
UNITED STATES 39, 41-42 (Carter ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as TERRITORIAL PAPERS]. 
15 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 43 n.15. 
16 See note 5 supra. 
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a quick look at the legislative agencies employed. First, and fore-
most, was Congress, which had power to make all laws necessary for 
territorial government. Congress did not, however, undertake to 
serve as the sole or principal legislative agency, except for Alaska 
1867-1912; Indian Territory 1889-1907; and the Canal Zone 1912-. 
Instead, it enacted a "charter" for each territory, and passed occa-
sional statutes to regulate the affairs of a particular territory, or 
of all the territories as a group. General power to legislate was 
delegated to the following agencies: 
I. Governor and judges. Northwest 1787-1798; Southwest 1790-
1794; Mississippi 1798-1800; Indiana 1800-1804; Louisiana (north 
of Orleans) 1804-1812; Michigan 1805-1823; Illinois 1809-1812; 
Arkansas 1819. 
2. Governor and council. Orleans 1804-1805; Florida 1822-
1845; Michigan 1823-1836. 
3. Legislature (governor, council, and representatives). North-
west 1799-1802; Southwest 1794-1796; Mississippi 1800-1817; In-
diana 1804-1816; Orleans 1805-1812; Missouri 1812-1821; Illinois 
1812-1818; Alabama 1817-1819; Arkansas 1819-1836. 
4. Governor and legislature (council and representatives). Wis-
consin 1836-1848; Iowa 1838-1846; Minnesota 1849-1858; New 
Mexico 1850-1912; Utah 1850-1896; Kansas 1854-1861; Nebraska 
1854-1867; Colorado 1861-1876; Nevada 1861-1864; Dakota 1861-
1889; Idaho 1863-1890; Montana 1864-1889; Wyoming 1868-1890; 
Oklahoma 1890-1907. 
5. Legislature (council or senate and representatives). Oregon 
1848-1859; Washington 1853-1889; Arizona 1863-1912; Alaska 
1912-1959; Puerto Rico 1900-1952; Hawaii 1900-1959; Philippines 
1902-1935. 
6. Legislature (one house). Guam 1950-; Virgin Islands 1954-. 
The governor and judges were empowered to adopt "such laws 
of the original States, criminal and civil, as might be necessary, and 
best suited to the circumstances of the district .... "17 Assemblies or-
ganized under the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance were 
authorized "to make laws in all cases for the good government of 
the district, not repugnant to the principles and Articles of this 
Ordinance." The legislative power of Orleans extended "to all the 
rightful subjects of legislation; but no law shall be valid which 
17 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a). 
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is inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United 
States .... "18 "Provisions" of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74 
"Common to all Territories" included: 
"Sec. 1851. The legislative power of every Territory shall 
extend to all rightJul subjects of legislation not inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States. But no 
law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of 
the soil; no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the 
United States; nor shall the lands or other property of non-
residents be taxed higher than the lands or other property 
of residents." 
The judges, appointed by the national government, served as 
legislators only briefly, but serving, as they did, at the beginning of 
territorial government, they had a controlling voice in shaping 
the earliest judicial systems. 
The governor, also an appointee of the national government, 
was a member of the legislative board during the periods of legis-
lation by governor and judges, and was a "division" of most of the 
later legislatures. At first no law was valid without the governor's 
approval, but this requirement was gradually changed to permit 
passage of a law over his veto by a two-thirds vote. That this was 
true of all territories on December I, 1873, is shown by section 
1842 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74. But in 1875 Congress 
added this proviso: 
"That so much of this section as provides for making any 
bill passed by the legislative assembly of a Territory a law, 
without the approval of the governor, shall not apply to the 
Territories of Utah and Arizona."19 
Members of the legislative councils were at first appointed by 
the national government, usually from panels submitted by the 
elected representatives (Northwest 1799-1892, Southwest I 794-
1796, Mississippi 1800-1817, Indiana 1800-1809, Orleans 1804-
1812, Michigan 1823-1827, Illinois 1809-1812, Missouri 1812-1816, 
Alabama 1817-1819, Florida 1822-1826); later, they were elected 
by popular vote. 
Final control over territorial legislation remained with Con-
gress, which reserved the power to annul any law that might be 
18 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284. 
19 Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318. 
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passed. The territories were permitted to send a delegate to Con-
gress, but he had no vote. 
The preceding sketch, coupled with the fact that before 1839 
the territorial governor-an appointee of the national government 
-appointed all local judicial officers, indicates the measure of 
self-government allowed under the colonial system of the United 
States. 
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS BEFORE 1836 
The following outline of the judicial systems of the twelve 




Three judges, any two to form a court (1787); one to hold 
court in absence of others (1792) 
t Probate (1787) 
t Magistrate (1787) 
•Federal (District of Ohio) 1801-1802 
Southwest (1790-1796) 
•Same as Northwest (1790) 
One judge to hold court in absence of others (1792) 
Mississippi (1798-1817) 
•Same as Northwest (1798) 
• Additional judge (1804) 
•Additional judge (1810) 
•Additional judge (1817) 
•General court 
To be held at future seat of Alabama government by the 
three additional judges or any two (1817) 
Indiana (1800-1817) 
•Same as Northwest (1800) 
At least two judges to compose court (1815) 
•Federal (District of Ohio) 1801-1802 
Orleans (1804-1812) 
•superior court 
Three judges, one to constitute a court (1804) 
•District Court (federal) 
One judge (1804) 
tinferior courts (1804-) 
tJustices of the peace (1804-) 
Louisiana (north of Orleans) (1804--1812) 
•Judges of Indiana 
All or any two to hold a court (1804-) 
•court (supreme-general-superior) 
Three judges, all or any two to hold a court (1805) 
• Established by Congress. 
t Expressly authorized or referred to by Congress. 
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Michigan (1805-1836) 
*Same as Northwest (1805) 
• Additional judge (1823) 
tCourts for eastern counties 
One or more judges of Supreme Court (1827) 
Illinois (1809-1818) 
*Same as Northwest (1809) 
*Court of appeals 
Three judges, or a majority of them (1815) 
*Circuit courts (three) 
Each to be held by one judge (1815) 
tinferior courts (1815) 




Three judges, any two to constitute a court (1812) 
tinferior courts (1812) · 
tJustices of the peace (1812) 
• Additional judge (1814) 
tCircuit courts 
Judges of superior court (1816) 
Alabama (1817-1819) 
*Same as Mississippi (1817) 
Arkansas (1819-1836) 
*Superior court 
Three judges, any two for appellate, any _one for original 
jurisdiction (1819) 
tinferior courts (1819) 
tJustices of the peace (1819) 
*Superior court 
Four judges, any two other than trial judge to hear appeals 
· (1828) 
tCircuit or district courts (four) 
Each to be held by one judge of superior court (1828) 
Florida (1822-1845) 
*Superior courts (two) 
Each to be held by one judge (1822; 1823) 
tinferior courts (1822; 1823) 
tJustices of the peace (1822; 1823) 
*Superior courts (three) 
Each to be held by one judge (1824) 
*Court of appeals 
Judges of superior courts, any two a quorum (1824) 
United States Supreme Court 
Writs of error to, and/or appeals from 
Superior territorial courts in federal-type cases concerning 
the United States (1805) 
Highest tribunal of Michigan in cases exceeding $1000 (1825) 
• Established by Congress. 
t Expressly authorized or referred to by Congress. 
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General court of Alabama in admiralty and maritime cases 
(1818) 
Arkansas superior court in certain land cases (1824); in cases 
exceeding $1000 (1828); to review law and fact in certain 
cases (1830) 
Superior courts and court of appeals of Florida in both 




By United States in Congress assembled 
Northwest (1787) 


























Florida (1822; 1823) 
Must reside in territory or district 
All territories (1812) 
Property 
Must own specified property while in office 
Northwest (1787) 
All territories having courts same as Northwest 
Not to practice law 
All territories (1812) 
3. CLERKS 




Residence, duties, fees, etc. 
Same territories 
Missouri (1812; 1814) 
Arkansas (1828) 
Florida (1822; 1823) 
4. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
Appointment 
By President of United States with advice and consent of Senate 
Number 
One for Orleans (federal) district (1804) 
48 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
One for each territory (1813) 
One for each Florida district (1822; 1823; 1824; 1828) 
Qualifications 
Learned in the law 
[Vol. 61 
5. UNITED STATES MARSHAL 
Appointment and number 
Same as UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, supra 
6. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 
Appointment 
By governor 
All territories (except Arkansas and Florida after 1829) 
By legislature 
Arkansas and Florida (1829) 




Term of office--four years 
Orleans (1804) 
Missouri (1812) 





Florida (1822; 1823) 
8. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Common-law jurisdiction 
Northwest (1787) 












Florida (1822; 1823; 1824) 
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
Alabama (1818) 
Florida (1826) 
Same as federal (Kentucky District) 
Orleans district court (federal) (1804) 
Superior courts of all territories not having a district court in 
cases concerning the United States (1805) 
Superior courts of Florida in cases arising under federal law 
(1822; 1823; 1824) 
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As shown by the above outline, Congress established at least 
one superior court in each territory, and, either expressly or im-
pliedly, authorized the territorial legislatures to establish others. 
Regulation of when, where, and how the courts were to exercise 
their respective jurisdictions was left in large measure to the local 
legislatures, "even to the defining of the jurisdiction of the several 
courts.''20 
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AFTER 1836 
The following "Provisions" of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74 
"Common to all the Territories" show that by 1873 a single judi-
cial system had been developed: 
"Sec. 1864. The supreme court of every Territory shall 
consist of a chief justice and two associate justices, any two 
of whom shall constitute a quorum .... 
"Sec. 1865. Every Territory shall be divided into three 
judicial districts; and a district court shall be held in each 
district of the Territory by one of the justices of the supreme 
court .... 
"Sec. 1867. No justices of the peace in any Territory shall 
have jurisidiction of any case in which the title to land, or the 
boundary thereof, in anywise comes in question. 
"Sec. 1868. The supreme court and the district courts, re-
spectively, of every Territory, shall possess chancery as well 
as common law jurisdiction. 
"Sec. 1869. Writs of error, bills of exception, and appeals 
shall be allowed, in all cases, from the final decisions of the dis-
trict courts to the supreme court of all the Territories .... 
"Sec. 1870. The supreme court of each Territory shall 
appoint its own clerk .... 
"Sec. 1871. Each judge of the supreme court of the respec-
tive Territories shall designate and appoint one person as 
clerk of the district court over which he presides .... 
"Sec. 1872. Every district clerk shall be also the register 
in chancery .... 
"Sec. 1875. There shall be appointed in each Territory a 
person learned in the law, to act as attorney for the United 
States .... 
"Sec. 1876. There shall be appointed a marshal for each 
Territory. He shall execute all process issuing from the terri-
20 Justice Bradley in Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 655 (1874). 
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torial courts when exercising their jurisdiction as circuit and 
district courts of the United States .... " 
"Provisions concerning particular Organized Territories" in-
dicate lack of uniformity in only a few features of the system. For 
example: 
"Sec. 1907. The judicial power in New Mexico, Utah, 
Washington, Colorado, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, and Wyo-
ming, shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, pro-
bate courts, and in justices of the peace. 
"Sec. 1908. The judicial power in Arizona shall be vested 
in a supreme court and such inferior courts as the legislative 
council may by law prescribe. 
"Sec. 1909. Writs of error and appeals from the final deci-
sions of the supreme court of either of the Territories of New 
Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, 
and Wyoming, shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States ... where .... 
"Sec. 1910. Each of the district courts in the Territories 
mentioned in the preceding section shall have and exercise 
the same jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, as is vested in the circuit 
and district courts of the United States .... 
"Sec. 1911. Writs of error and appeals from the final deci-
sions of the supreme court of Washington Territory, shall be 
allowed and may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United 
States ... where .... 
"Sec. 1912. The supreme and district courts of each Ter-
ritory, and the respective judges thereof, except for Idaho and 
Montana, may grant writs of habeas corpus in which the same 
may be grantable by the judges of the United States in the 
District of Columbia." 
The standardized or established judicial system shown by the 
above provisions was the end-product of a long period of experi-
mentation commenced by the preliminary drafts of the Northwest 
Ordinance prior to 1787, and carried forward by Congress and the 
governments of the twelve territories organized before 1836. It was 
first formulated in the Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836 which, ac-
cording to Chief Justice Chase (1871),21 "seems to have received 
full consideration, and from which all subsequent acts for the or-
21 Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 444 (1871). Chief Justice Salmon P. 
Chase edited the statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory in 1833, and was 
an expert on territorial government. 
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ganization of Territories have been copied, with few and incon-
siderable variations." 
When Iowa was created out of Wisconsin in 1838, the judicial 
system provided by Congress was the same as that of Wisconsin ex-
cept, instead of "during good behaviour," the superior judges were 
to be appointed for four years, and each was to reside in the district 
to which he should be assigned. In 1839 the Iowa legislature was 
authorized to provide for the election of sheriffs, judges of probate, 
and justices of the peace.22 The same authority was given the Wis-
consin legislature in 1843.23 The Wisconsin system, as modified by 
these changes, was the system first established in: 
Oregon (1848) Kansas (1854) Idaho (1863) 
Minnesota (1849) Nebraska (1854) Montana (1864) 
New Mexico (1850) Colorado (1861) Wyoming (1868) 
Utah (1850) Nevada (1861) Oklahoma (1890) 
Washington (1853) Dakota (1861) 
The courts first provided for the following territories differed 
from those of the standardized or established system in the respects 
indicated: Arizona 1863 (supreme; inferior); Alaska 1884 (district; 
commissioners); Indian 1889 (United States court); Hawaii 1900 
(supreme; circuit; inferior, United States District Court); Puerto 
Rico 1900 (courts established by military-supreme, municipal, 
police; United States District Court); Philippines 1902 (courts es-
tablished by commission-supreme, first instance, municipal); 
Canal Zone 1912 (district; magistrates); Virgin Islands 1936 and 
Guam 1950 (district court; courts established by law). 
The standardized or established territorial judicial system-
our third judicial system-differed significantly from both the 
state judicial systems and the federal judicial system in that it 
served all the purposes of state courts, and at the same time 
handled all federal matters requiring judicial attention in the 
territories. 
JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURTS 
A. Common Law 
The superior judges of Northwest, and of all territories estab-
lished in the area east of the Mississippi relinquished by England 
22 Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 92, 5 Stat. 357. See HAYNES, Selection and Tenure of 
Judges, THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, 1830-1850, ch. IV (1944). 
28 Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 99, 5 Stat. 630. 
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in 1783, were vested by Congress with a "common law jurisdic-
tion" to be exercised "according to the course of the common 
law."24 The superior judges of Orleans (1804),25 Missouri (1812),26 
Arkansas (1819),27, and Florida (1822, 1823, 1824)28 were given 
jurisdiction of "criminal cases" and "civil cases." These territories 
were parts of the Louisiana and Florida purchases, and it was not 
clear at the beginning whether the prior Spanish law or English-
type law was to furnish the rule of decision. 
A memorial to Congress submitted by the Indiana Legislature 
in 1814 suggested the propriety of pointing out by law 
" ... what common law the ordinance refers to, whether the 
common law of England, of France, or of the Territory over 
which the ordinance is the constitution. If it should be deter-
mined that, by the expression of the ordinance, a common 
law jurisdiction should be located on the common law of 
England, it is essential to define to what extent of that com-
mon law the judges shall take cognizance; whether the whole 
extent of feudal and gothic customs of England; whether 
the customs, or unwritten law shall be taken with the statute • 
law, and that to form the common law to govern the judges; 
or whether the unwritten and statute law is to be taken in 
contradistinction to the laws, customs, and rules of chancery; 
or whether it includes that law which is common to all.".211 
The Indiana legislators had little or no reason to believe that the 
term "common law" used in the Ordinance of 1787 referred to the 
common law of France. The laws and customs of Canada, includ-
ing the Custom of Paris, previously in force in the area under the 
Quebec Act of 1774, had been recognized by the Ordinance, but 
only to the extent of "saving" to the French and Canadian in-
habitants of certain villages "their laws and customs now in force 
among them relative to the descent & conveyance of property." 
Reference to the legislative history of the Ordinance would have 
shown that the term "common law" was used in contradistinction 
to "chancery" and that both terms referred to jurisdiction of the 
24 Art. II, Northwest Ordinance of 1787, l Stat. 51 n.(a). 
25 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 5, 2 Stat. 284. 
26 Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § IO, 2 Stat. 746. 
27 Act of March 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 7, 3 Stat. 495. 
28 Act of March 30, 1822, ch. 13, § 6, 3 Stat. 656; Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 7, 
3 Stat. 752; Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 163, 4 Stat. 45. 
29 ANNALS OF CONG., 13th Cong., 3d Sess. 401 (1814). 
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kind exercised by the central English courts. "Common law" with-
out further specification was entirely too vague to serve as a guide 
for deciding cases. 
The Orleans Organic Act of 180430 made no reference to "com-
mon law," nor did the amended act of 180531 which put in force 
some of the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance. Nevertheless, 
lawyers newly settled in Orleans took the position. that by ex-
tending provisions of the Northwest Ordinance to the Territory, 
Congress had substituted the English common law for the law pre-
viously in force. A contrary position was taken by Edward Living-
ston and local French lawyers, and the question was argued at 
length in a test case. According to one of his biographers,32 Living-
ston argued that the words "common law" should be construed as 
the "common law of Louisiana," and this position was in fact sus-
tained by the court.33 An account of this case by "An Old Louisi-
anian" will be found in The Courier (New Orleans) of January 15, 
1824: 
"Mr. Livingston had been hardly fifteen months in New 
Orleans, when Congress were pleased to form Louisiana into 
separate territories, and to give us, as a constitution, the ordi-
nance of l 787, which had been framed for a country almost 
desert to the northwest of the Ohio .•.. As if to crown the 
work, that famous ordinance did contain a clause providing 
that the Superior Court should exercise a jurisdiction of com-
mon law. What a resource did not those few words, apparently 
so positive, offer to all the lawyers brought among us by the 
taking of possession? ... If that clause was put in force, every 
thing was at an end in our jurisprudence; our ancient laws 
would have disappeared, and upon their venerable ruins 
would have been erected a system which none of us was ac-
quainted with, which nowhere exists in a body of law, and 
which its warmest advocates themselves do hardly know .... 
So we did see pretended patriots, self-styled honest men, ac-
tuated by a disgusting cupidity, unite all their efforts and 
their criminal boldness, and under the pretense of an exclu-
30 Ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283. 
31 Act of March 2, 1805, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 323. 
32 HATCHER, EDWARD LMNGSTON ll9 (1940). 
88 HUNT, LIFE OF EDWARD LMNGSTON 117 (1864) stated: "I have not found anything 
that could be called a report of the argument he delivered on this occasion; but it 
produced a profound impression." 
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sive adherence to the letter of the paramount law, assert that 
from thenceforth we should be governed by the Common 
Law of England.-That great question was at length brought 
before the Superior Court. Livingston, the courageous and 
generous Livingston, entered alone the lists against them all . 
. . . His generous exertions were crowned by the success most 
glorious for him, the most happy for his new brethren the 
Louisianians. The Superior Court declared itself in his favor, 
and in so doing, freed us from that inextricable labyrinth of 
incoherent decision, scattered in thousands of volumes, and 
which people have been pleased to decorate with the pompous 
name of Common law . ... "34 
Free to choose what law should govern the Territory, the legis-
lature followed the precedent of the Quebec Act by continuing 
the prior law for civil cases while adopting the English common 
law for criminal cases. 35 
Florida was given a similar choice, but instead of continuing 
the Spanish law for civil cases, the legislative council declared in 
1822 that "the common law of England" and certain English 
statutes, together with American chancery practice, should be "the 
rule of decision."36 A year earlier Spanish criminal procedure had 
been supplanted by proceedings "according to the course of the 
common law."37 After these developments the civil jurisdiction of 
the superior courts was described as being "in law and equity."38 
The same was true of Missouri and Arkansas after the Missouri 
Legislature had made English law "the rule of decision."39 In 
Louisiana (north of Orleans) the judges had the same jurisdiction 
as those of Indiana40-the common-law jurisdiction conferred by 
the Northwest Ordinance. 
B. Chancery 
The earliest drafts of the Northwest Ordinance provided for 
territorial judges who should have "a common law and chancery 
34 Referred to by Brown, Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1801-1812, 
l AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 38-40 (1957). 
35 The 1805 statute which "introduced the common law in all criminal matters" is 
quoted and interpreted in State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545 (La. 1844). 
36 FLORIDA TERRITORY SESSIONS LAws (Sept. 2, 1822). 
37 Ordinance of Maj. Gen. Jackson to Regulate Criminal Procedure, July 21, 1821, 
reported in ORDINANCES OF THE PROVINCES OF THE FLORIDAS, BUT RELATING SPECIFICALLY TO 
WEST FLORIDA, AS PROCLAIMED BY MAJOR GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON (McMurtrie ed. 1941). 
38 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, 4 Stat. 164. 
39 Act of April 29, 1816, ch. 155, § 3, 3 Stat. 328. 
40 Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 331. 
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jurisdiction."41 Why the words "and chancery" were omitted from 
the draft of May 10, 1787, and from the Ordinance, has not been 
established, but it seems probable that the suggestion came from 
the New England "adventurers" known as the Ohio Company who 
were negotiating for the purchase of six or seven million acres of 
the government's western land.42 The significance of the omission 
was noted by St. Clair, governor of Northwest, in a letter to judges 
Parsons and Varnum in 1788: 
"As Judges, you are clothed with a common Law Jurisdic-
tion, which is, at once, both descriptive & restrictive;-restric-
tive as to any Powers in Equity."48 
Judges Parsons and Varnum were well-educated and experienced 
New England lawyers fully familiar with the Massachusetts scheme 
of administering equity through common law forms. The governor 
was from Pennsylvania where a similar scheme was in operation. 
As a member of Congress the governor knew the legislative history 
of the Ordinance. Fully aware of the restriction implied by the 
omission of the words "and chancery" the officers of Northwest at 
no time attempted to confer on the superior court equity jurisdic-
tion beyond that administered in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania 
through common law forms. 
In 1802 the justices of an Indiana court of common pleas pre-
sented to Congress a petition praying that the Northwest Ordi-
nance "be so far revised and amended by law, as to give chancery 
powers to the judges of the said Territory."44 Reporting to the 
House of Representatives in 1803, a committee stated: 
"The courts without equitable jurisdiction will inevita-
bly, in some instances, become the instruments of iniquity, 
instead of the administrators of justice. Fraud, accident, and 
hardship, ingredients in many of those transactions of human 
life, which constitute the basis of litigation; entrenched with-
in legal forms and veiled with specious, but deceitful appear-
ances, are many times not within the reach of a tribunal, 
vested with common law powers only. To develop, and re-
lieve against them, an equitable jurisdiction is necessary."45 
41 See notes 10-12 supra. 
42 Some of the circumstances will be found in Blume, Chancery Practice on the 
American Frontier, 59 MICH. L. REv. 49, 50-53 (1960). 
43 2 Sr. CLAIR PAPERS 72, 76; 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 273, 277. 
H ANNALS OF CONG., 7th Cong., 1st Sess. 1131 (1802). 
<Its ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 1577 (1803). 
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Nothing resulting from the committee's recommendation that the 
judges of Indiana and other territories be vested with "the powers 
usually exercised by a court of equity," the Indiana legislature in 
1805 established a separate "Court of Chancery."46 Writing in 1807 
Governor Harrison of Indiana stated: 
"If ever there was a country where a court of Chancery 
was necessary, ours is the one; because in no other (as I believe) 
has there ever been so much valuable property transferred 
without the observance of the legal forms of conveyance, or 
where the evasion of the specific performance of contracts 
would produce so much confusion, injustice, and ruin."47 
In 1816 Congress removed the implied restriction by empowering 
the "general court" to exercise "chancery powers as well as a com-
mon law jurisdiction."48 A year earlier similar powers had been 
conferred on the superior judges of Illinois.49 The legislature of 
Illinois had refused to continue the separate "Court of Chancery" 
inherited from Indiana,50 but had in 1812 attempted to establish a 
"Court of Chancery" to be held by the judges of the General 
Court.51 
The governor and judges of Michigan, presumably unaware of 
the legislative history of the court provision of the Northwest Or-
dinance, provided in 1805 that the territorial supreme court 
should have certain original jurisdiction "both in law and equity" ;52 
and declared in 1812 that the court should have jurisdiction of "all 
matters in equity."53 "Rousseau," in the Detroit Gazette of Decem-
ber 5, 1817, complained: 
"The ordinance ... declares 'There shall be appointed a 
Court, to consist of three Judges, who shall have a common 
law jurisdiction.' Is it not plain that no other but a common 
law jurisdiction is granted? and that this jurisdiction can only 
be enlarged by the same authority which granted it? . . . I 
46 LA.ws OF INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at 108 (Philbrick ed. 1930) [hereinafter 
cited as INDIANA LAws]. 
47 Id. at clxvii. 
48 Act of April 29, 1816, ch. 154, § 6, 3 Stat. 327. 
49 Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 98, § 5, 3 Stat. 237. 
50 THE LA.ws OF lu.INoIS TERRITORY 1809-1818, at 5 (Philbrick ed. 1950) [hereinafter 
cited as ILLINOIS LA.ws]. 
51 Id. at 52. 
52 1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 9 (reprint 1871) [hereinafter cited as 
MICHIGAN LA.ws]. 
53 Id. at 183. For text see 8 MICHIGAN PIONEER COLLECTIONS 617 (1907). 
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therefore protest against the right of the legislative board ... 
to vest this court with any powers at all. . .. But our Judges, 
forsooth, not content with limited powers-powers adequate 
to every useful purpose, usurp such as are not granted, erect 
themselves by a law of their own passing into a Supreme 
Court,-by another, giving themselves 'jurisdiction in all cases 
of divorce and alimony' and by another 'of all matters in 
equity.'" 
William Woodbridge, Secretary of the Territory, wrote Solomon 
Sibley, delegate to Congress, in 1820, that "Judge Griffin now 
expresses doubts whether, without an act of Congress, the Supreme 
Court can entertain jurisdiction of Chancery Cases.''54 In 1823 
Congress provided that the judges of Michigan should possess "a 
chancery, as well as common law, jurisdiction.''55 
In Mississippi inability to nullify Spanish land grants, fraudu-
lently dated so as to appear to precede the treaty between the 
United States and Spain, led to demands for the establishment of 
a court of chancery. According to a report made by Governor 
Claiborne to Secretary Madison in 1801,56 oral testimony was ad-
mitted in an inferior court to invalidate a certain antedated grant, 
but on appeal to the superior court this evidence was declared in-
admissible. The governor stated that he was opposed to a change 
in the law of evidence, and saw no remedy, "unless indeed, a Court 
of Chancery would reach the case, and it seems to be the opinion 
of most of the Lawyers here that it would not." In 1802 the local 
legislature provided that each "superior court of law" should also 
"be and act as a court of equity for the same district," final decrees 
to be passed by at least two judges.57 The act further provided for 
jury trial of issues of fact, the mode of proceeding to be the same 
"in every respect, as in trials at law.'' In 1809 it was directed that 
"circuit" court be called a "superior court of law and equity."58 
This scheme was inherited by Alabama in 1817. 
M Sibley Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit, Michigan. 
Judge Griffin was in Indiana serving as a territorial judge when the questioned chancery 
jurisdiction for that territory was under consideration, and was familiar with the dif-
ficulties of interpretation encountered there. 
55 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 36, § 3, 3 Stat. 769. 
56 1 MISSISSIPPI TERRITORIAL ARCHIVES 1798-1803, at 363 (Rowland ed. 1905). 
57 Miss. Acts, 1st Gen. Ass., 1st &: 2d Sess. 186 (1802). 
58 Miss. Acts, 6th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. 98 (1809). Details of this and other Mississippi 
developments with texts of pertinent sessions laws will be found in Penzien, Court Or-
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In the territory south of the Ohio which became Tennessee in 
1796, North Carolina statutes were continued in force including 
an act "giving equity jurisdiction to the superior courts of law" 
and an act "for better regulating the proceedings in courts of 
equity.''59 At first the court conducted by the three judges ap-
pointed under acts of Congress and the "ordinance of the old con-
gress" was known as a "superior court of law" ;60 later it was called 
a court of "law and equity.''61 
In Orleans, as noted above,62 the superior court's jurisdiction 
was characterized as "criminal" and "civil" with no subdivision of 
"civil" into "law" and "chancery.'' In Louisiana (north of Orleans) 
the jurisdiction of the superior judges was "common law"63 until 
1810 when the local legislature conferred, or attempted to confer, 
"a chancery jurisdiction.''64 This scheme was inherited by Missouri 
and was continued by local legislation.65 In 1816 Congress removed 
any doubts by providing, as it had for Illinois and Indiana, that the 
Missouri superior courts should "possess and exercise chancery 
powers as well as common law jurisdiction in all civil cases.''66 Laws 
in force in Missouri in 1819 were continued in force in Arkansas. 
As to Florida, after the local legislature had made English law the 
"rule of decision,"67 Congress provided (1826) that the superior 
courts should "have and exercise original jurisdiction in all civil 
causes, in law and equity.''68 
Commencing in 1805 the superior courts of all the territories, 
except Orleans with its separate federal court, had original jurisdic-
tion of all suits in equity involving more than $500 brought by 
the United States as plaintiff.69 
ganization in the Mississippi Territory, Jan. 1958 (unpublished thesis in University of 
Michigan Law Library). 
59 1 LAws OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 1715-1820, at 457 (Scott's Revisals 1821) [here-
inafter cited as TENNESSEE LAws]. 
60 Ibid. 
01 Id. at 497. 
62 See note 30 supra. 
63 Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 331. 
64 1 LAWS OF THE DISTRicr OF LOUISIANA, OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA, OF THE 
TERRITORY OF MISSOURI, AND OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI UP TO THE YEAR 1824, at 240 
(1842) [hereinafter cited as LAws OF LoUJSIANA AND MISSOURI]. 
65 Id. at 349, 445. 
66 Act of April 29, 1816, ch. 155, § 3, 3 Stat. 328. 
67 See note 36 supra. 
68 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, 4 Stat. 164. 
69 Origin of this special federal-type jurisdiction will be noted under "Admiralty" 
1962] TERRITORIAL CouRTS AND LAW 59 
Of the twelve territories organized before 1836, all except 
Northwest and Orleans had superior courts with chancery as well 
as common-law jurisdiction. In most of them chancery jurisdiction 
was at first conferred locally, Congress acting later. In Northwest 
equity was administered through common-law forms. In Orleans 
equity administered by the superior court was the Roman-law 
type, not the separate equity of English chancery.70 The Orleans 
district court had the same equity jurisdiction as other federal 
courts. All superior courts of the sixteen territories having the 
standardized or established judicial system, first formulated for 
Wisconsin in 1836, possessed "chancery as well as common law 
jurisdiction." This standardized expression reflects the fact that 
chancery was an after-thought, something added to the original 
grant. 
C. Probate 
Wills and conveyances of land made as prescribed by the North-
west Ordinance were to be effective "provided such wills be duly 
proved and be recorded within one year after proper magistrates, 
courts and registers shall be appointed for that purpose." Con-
sidering this a mandate to provide for the probate of wills, the 
governor and judges of Northwest, as one of their earliest legisla-
tive acts (1788), authorized the appointment of a probate judge for 
each county, and provided for probate courts to be held by the 
probate judge assisted by two judges of the county court of com-
mon pleas.71 The court, as distinguished from the judge, was to 
act whenever it was necessary "to render a definitive sentence, or 
to render a final decree." In adopting this statute the judges re-
jected a recommendation of Governor St. Clair72 that the Pennsyl-
vania probate system be adopted. Established in a territory which 
had neither ecclesiastical courts nor courts of chancery, the North-
west probate courts had to exercise a combined jurisdiction similar 
to that exercised by the probate courts of Massachusetts. 
In 1795 the governor and judges of Northwest added an "or-
infra. Consideration of whether it was necessary to administer law and equity separately 
will be found under "Regulation of Superior Court Procedure.'' 
70 See Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TuL. L. R.Ev. 485 
(19!15). 
71 PEASE 9; I STATUTES OF Omo AND OF THE NoRTHWESn:RN TERRITORY 96 (Chase ed. 
18!1!1) [hereinafter cited as CHASE]. 
72 2 ST. CLAIR PAPERS 67; !I TERRITORIAL PAPERS 270. 
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phans court" to be held by the justices of the county courts of 
quarter sessions.73 This statute, copied from Pennsylvania, con-
ferred a jurisdiction which overlapped that of the probate courts.74 
It has been said that the Orphans Court of Pennsylvania "which 
may be described in a general way as a court having control of 
everything relating to decedents' estates, has always been, so far 
as its jurisdiction extends, a court with full equity powers."75 Ac-
cording to an Ohio judge, the Northwest orphans court had "pe-
culiar facilities for acquiring correct information of the condition 
of intestates' estates."76 
In Michigan Territory the governor and judges adopted in 
1818 a complete probate code made up almost entirely of statutes 
copied from Massachusetts.77 The Massachusetts probate courts, 
in the absence of ecclesiastical and chancery courts, had exercised 
in combination the separate powers of the ecclesiastical, chancery, 
and common-law courts of England.78 This was well suited to 
Northwest but in Michigan, where a superior court exercising 
full chancery jurisdiction was in operation, a question arose 
whether this grant of combined jurisdiction to the inferior court 
had the effect of limiting the chancery jurisdiction of the superior 
court. Answering this question in 1829, Sibley, a judge of the ter-
ritorial supreme court, stated: 
"I am aware of the great inconvenience and hardship that 
would be imposed on the Citizens of the Territory, to be 
called before this Court, instead of the Courts of probate, 
which are located in every County of the Territory, for the 
settlement of decedents estates-And I am not, as at present 
advised, prepared to sustain that broad proposition-I am in-
clined to the opinion, that our probate laws do restrain the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and that it was the 
73 1 CHASE 159; PEASE 181. 
74 See letter from Governor St. Clair to justices of the Orphans Court of Hamilton 
County (copy to probate judge) dated Sept. 8, 1796, comparing the two jurisdictions. 
3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 460. 
75 Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common Law Forms, 1 L.Q. REY. 
455, 461 (1885). 
76 Lessee of Ludlow's Heirs v. McBride, 3 Ohio 241, 259 (1827). 
77 For a list of these statutes, see Blume, Probate and Administration on the Amer-
ican Frontier, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 209, 242 (1959). 
78 See Atkinson, The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System, 42 MICH. 
L. REY. 425 (1943). For the English development, see Murphy, Early Forms of Probate 
and Administration: Some Evidence Concerning Their Modern Significance. 3 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 125 (1959). 
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evident intention of the Legislature that the Judge of probate 
should have exclusive original jurisdiction, in cases made cog-
nizable before him, wherein he is vested with sufficient powers 
to give by his Decrees adequate relief."79 
61 
In 1863 Justice Campbell of the state supreme court was "very 
strongly inclined to the opinion that under our probate system 
the Court of Chancery has only jurisdiction in those cases in which 
an adequate remedy does not exist in the Probate Court."80 Sim-
ilar views were expressed by Justice Gooley in 1871. 
To the statement quoted above Sibley added: 
"I am fortified in this opinion, by the provision of the 
Law which gives an appeal from the decrees of the probate to 
the Supreme Court, where his acts and proceedings may be 
revised, and if found erroneous rectified."81 
Any lost original jurisdiction could be exercised on appeal. In 
Northwest the superior court exercised this type of chancery juris-
diction only on appeal. 
Summarizing the developments before 1836, we find that juris-
diction of probate and administration was vested in local courts 
established by the territorial legislatures, and not in the superior 
courts established by Congress, except for a brief period in Michi-
gan. 82 The superior courts did, however, serve as courts of probate 
79 Abbott v. Abbott (1829), as reported in 5 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 375, 382 (Blume ed. 1940). 
80 People v. Circuit Court for the County of Wayne, 11 Mich. 393, 403 (1863). 
81 Holbrook v. Campau, 22 Mich. 288 (1871). 
82 The local courts of Northwest became courts of Indiana in 1800 and continued 
until 1805 when the four county courts (common pleas, quarter sessions, probate, and 
orphans) were consolidated into one court of common pleas. INDIANA LAws 115. An 
act regulating the administration of estates published in 1807 (id. at 270) provided for 
appeal to "the General, or Circuit Courts." In 1812 the Illinois legislature declared that 
the Illinois courts of common pleas should "possess and exercise the same jurisdiction 
and powers" as possessed and exercised by the Indiana courts on March I, 1809. ILLINOIS 
LAws 57. A law "concerning wills and intestacies" published in Michigan in 1805 
(I MICHIGAN LAws 57), provided that "the courts of the several districts of Michigan, or 
any judge of the said territory, or the clerk of the court of the district, shall have 
power to take the proof of a will, and grant a certificate of such probate." What to do 
in case of will contest was specified. In 1809 judges of probate were appointed under a 
law copied from Vermont later declared invalid. For details of this controversy, see 
Blume, supra note 77, at 222-24, 241. In 1810 the district courts were abolished by a 
statute which declared "the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend 
to all matters, above the value of one hundred dollars, &: to the probate of wills." 
I MICHIGAN LAws 186. The supreme court was the only probate agency in the 
territory from September 1810 to January 1811, when provision was made for 
Registers of Probate. Id. at 160. A law copied from Massachusetts established probate 
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appeal. Lack of ecclesiastical courts and, for a time, lack of courts 
of chancery led to a great deal of experimentation. Separate courts 
courts in 1818 with appeal to the supreme court. Id. at 341. In the territory south of 
the Ohio which became Tennessee in 1796, the "superior court of law" established by 
Congress was given chancery jurisdiction by the local legislature including cognizance 
of "all suits and demands relative to legacies, filial portions, and estates of intestates." 
1 TENNESSEE LAws 457. By the same statute (1794), the county courts of pleas and 
quarter sessions were directed to take the probate of wills and to make orders relative 
to letters testamentary and of administration. (Similar to the North Carolina statute 
of 1777, id. at 185.) The county courts also had power to appoint guardians for "idiots 
and lunatics," and to provide for the administration of their estates. "A law establishing 
a court of probate" adopted in Mississippi in 1799 [MISS. HISTORICAL REcoRDs SURVEY, 
SARGENT'S CoDE 1799-1800, at 19 (1939)] was a combination of two Northwest laws, one 
adopted in 1788 (establishing a court of probate), and the other in 1795 (empowering 
judges of probate to appoint guardians to minors and others). The first governor of 
Mississippi, formerly secretary of Northwest, stated in 1800: "We began legislating 
however, with the Laws of the Northwestern Territory only • • . .'' 1 THE MISSISSIPPI 
TERRITORIAL AR.CHIVES 1793-1803, at 250 (Rowland ed. 1905). In 1802 county courts 
replaced the several courts of probate, common pleas, and quarter sessions. Miss. Acts, 
1st Gen. Ass., 1st &: 2d Sess. 21 (1802). In 1803 the justices of the county courts were 
directed to hold orphans courts in each county "for taking the probate of wills and 
granting letters of administration," and for "appointing guardians to minors, idiots, 
lunatics, and persons non compos mentis." Miss. Acts, 2d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1803); THE 
STATUTES 'OF MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 275 (Toulmin ed. 1805). Appeals could be taken to 
the "superior court of the county or district.'' This law was in force during the period 
of Alabama Territory and was in force in the state of Alabama in 1823. DIGEST OF THE 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 175 (Toulmin ed. 1823). For Louisiana (north of 
Orleans), the governor and judges of Indiana established in 1804 judges and courts of 
probate similar to those of Northwest. 1 LAWS OF LOUISIANA AND MISSOURI 57. Orphans 
courts were added by the legislature in 1807. Id. at 125, 140. Inherited by Missouri, 
the Louisiana acts were repealed in 1815 by a Missouri statute which conferred jurisdic-
tion of probate and administration on the "circuit courts in the several counties.'' Id. 
at 394, 420. Appeals to the "superior •court" were authorized. Inherited by Arkansas, 
the Missouri act was modified in 1829 by an Arkansas statute which established "county 
courts" and provided these courts should have jurisdiction of probate and administration. 
STEELE &: M'CAMPBELL, LAws OF ARKANSAS TERRITORY 157 (1835). In 1804 the "Governor 
of the Mississippi Territory, exercising the powers of Governor General and Intendant 
of the Province of Louisiana" ordained the appointment of a "special administrator" for 
Orleans to take charge of the estates of a certain class of intestates until ordinary 
letters of administration should be issued. In 1807 the Orleans legislature made provision 
for "parish" judges with "civil, criminal and police jurisdiction" (Miss. Acts, 2d Sess., 
1st Leg., ch. 1, § 10, at 14), "in lieu of judges of county courts" provided by an act passed 
April 10, 1805. 1 McMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 4 (1939). Section 15 of the 1807 act 
declared that the "parish judges" should have jurisdiction "in all matters relative to the 
proof of wills, appointment of guardians and curators, according to the existing laws 
of the territory, and the appointment of administrators in cases of persons deceased 
intestate.'' According to Pound: "In Louisiana, where succession under the civil law 
had always belonged to the ordinary courts, and no separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
had existed, such matters were committed to the district courts and the functions of a 
probate court were largely exercised by the clerks.'' POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 140 
(1940). See also Simes, Model Probate Code and Probate Procedures in Louisiana, l 
La. B.J., April 1954, p. 51; McMahon, The Background, Structure and Composition of 
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 7 La. B.J., Feb. 1960, p. 246. In 1821 General 
Jackson, exercising the powers and authorities formerly exercised by the Captain General 
and Intendant of Cuba, and by the Governors of East and West Florida (22 TERRITORIAL 
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called "probate courts" were established in six of the twelve terri-
tories organized before 1836.83 
The judicial system provided for Wisconsin in 1836,84 and 
later established in fifteen other territories, included "probate 
courts" as separate courts. Organization of these courts was left to 
the territorial governments with freedom to provide local election 
or appointment of the judges. The territorial governments could 
not, however, confer on the probate courts any jurisdiction vested 
by Congress in the superior judges appointed by the national 
government. A Utah statute "conferring general jurisdiction in 
chancery, and at law on the Probate Courts" was declared void 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1874, Justice Miller 
observing: "This view is supported by the decisions of the courts 
of Kansas, on a similar statute; by decisions in Idaho, and by the 
decisions of the Supreme Court whose judgment we are here called 
on to reverse."85 In 1887 Congress disapproved and annulled all 
Utah laws that had conferred jurisdiction on probate courts "other 
than in respect to the estates of deceased persons, and in respect of 
the guardianship of the persons and property of infants, and in 
respect of the persons and property of persons not of sound mind."86 
D. Divorce 
In 1795 the governor and judges of Northwest conferred on the 
"General Court" and circuit courts "sole cognizance of all divorces 
PAPERS 9), ordained the establishment of county courts with jurisdiction of all criminal 
cases and of all civil cases exceeding 20 dollars. ORDINANCES OF THE PROVINCES OF THE 
FLORIDAS, BUT RELATING SPECIFICALLY TO WEST FLORIDA, AS PROCLAIMED BY MAJOR 
GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON (McMurtrie ed. 1941). The Ordinance further provided "the 
Alcaldes shall continue to exercise the powers of Judges of Probate, Registers of Wills," 
subject to appeal to the county court in all cases. The county courts as re-established in 
1823 [l FLORIDA STAT. ANN. at lxx (1943)] were authorized in 1828 to take proof of wills, 
issue letters of administration, hear complaints against guardians, and do generally the 
work of a probate court. COMPILATION OF PUBLIC Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF 
THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 168 (Duval ed. 1839). 
83 Sec laws of Northwest, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Louisiana (north of 
Orleans), and Missouri, note 82 supra. 
Si Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 9, 5 Stat. 13. 
SIS Ferris v. Higley, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 375, 384 (1874). 
86 Anti-Polygamy Act of 1887, ch. 397, § 12, 24 Stat. 637. Jurisdiction other than that 
specified in this statute was conferred by Congress on the following probate courts: 
Colorado (common law and chancery not exceeding $2,000) Act of March 2, 1863, 
ch. 70, § 3, 12 Stat. 700; Montana (civil not exceeding $500, criminal not requiring 
jury) Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 150, § 2, 14 Stat. 426; Idaho (same as Montana) Act of 
Dec. 13, 1870, ch. 1, 16 Stat. 395; Utah (divorce) Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, § 3, 
18 Stat. 254. 
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applied for or made."87 The circuit courts referred to were sup-
posed to be held by the superior judges at nisi prius. In England 
divorces were granted either by ecclesiastical courts (a mensa et 
thoro) or by Parliament (a vinculo matrimonii) but not by the 
common-law courts or the Court of Chancery.88 That the North-
west legislators had power to confer this type of jurisdiction on the 
"common law" court established by Congress has been denied,89 
but in the absence of ecclesiastical courts the choice was between 
leaving all divorces to the legislature or conferring divorce juris-
diction on a common-law or probate court. 
By an act published in 180 I the governor and judges of Indiana 
repealed the Northwest divorce law of 1795,00 but in 1803 declared 
it should continue in force until the end of the first session of the 
general assembly.91 A revision made in 1807 left unchanged the 
provision conferring sole jurisdiction on "the General court, and 
the Circuit courts."92 A divorce was granted by the legislature in 
1808, however, in an unusually complicated situation.93 
The Indiana act of 1807, in force when Illinois was created out 
of Indiana, appears in Pope's Digest of Illinois Laws (1815).9 '4 A 
divorce was granted by the Illinois legislature in 1818, the statute 
reciting that the petitioner "must be considerably injured if she 
cannot obtain a divorce sooner than in the ordinary way."95 
A law "concerning the supreme court of the Territory of Mich-
igan," published by the governor and judges of that Territory in 
1805, conferred on the "common law" court established by Con-
gress certain chancery powers, and "exclusive" jurisdiction of "all 
causes of divorce and alimony."96 After a period of uncertainty 
(1805-1819), the divorce business of the court was classified as 
chancery (1819-1832).97 After 1832 divorce actions were statutory. 
In the period 1828-1831 at least seventeen divorces were granted 
87 1 CHASE 192; PEASE 258. 
88 See Woodhouse, The Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3 AM. J. LEGAL. H1sr. 260 
(1959). 
89 1 MARSHALL, A HisrORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF OHIO 218 (1934), 
90 INDIANA LAws 15. 
91 Id. at 64, 66. 
92 Id. at 323. 
93 Id. at 648. 
94 1 THE LAws OF INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at 117 (Philbrick ed. 1938). 
95 ILLINOIS LAws 309. 
96 1 MICHIGAN LAws 9. 
97 For details, see Blume, Chancery Practice on the American Frontier, 59 MICH. L. 
REv. 49, 60-64 (1960). 
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by legislative acts. A bill in chancery for "alimony merely"-not 
for divorce-was pending when the territorial court ceased to 
exist in 1836.98 The state chancellor dismissed the bill observing 
that "the whole current of authorities goes to show that courts of 
chancery have never entertained jurisdiction in cases of this kind, 
except in aid of some other court, or to carry into effect a marriage 
contract, or in the execution of a trust."99 
Developments in the other eight territories organized before 
I 836 show similar experimentation. Divorce laws were adopted 
in (or inherited by) Mississippi 1803;100 Louisiana (north of Or-
leans) 1807;101 Orleans 1808;102 Missouri 1812;103 Alabama 1817;10¼ 
Arkansas 1819;105 Florida 1828.106 And in all except Orleans power 
to grant absolute divorce was vested in the superior courts. In 
Orleans "separation from bed and board" might be claimed in 
"competent courts of justice." In the territory which became 
Tennessee no divorce law was in force until enacted by the State 
in I 799.107 Legislative divorces were granted in Mississippi (I 799-
1800) ;108 in Orleans (1807).109 Toulmin's 1823 Digest of Alabama 
Laws110 contains "A list of Cases in which Laws granting Divorces 
were passed during the existence of the Territorial Government of 
Alabama Territory." Florida's divorce law was passed after Con-
gress (1826) had disapproved and annulled "the several acts passed 
by the governor and legislative council, granting divorces."111 
In Maynard v. Hill (1888)112 the Supreme Court of the United 
States was called upon to decide the validity of an Oregon legisla-
tive act which had granted a divorce in 1852. After a review of the 
98 Peltier v. Peltier, Harr. Mich. Ch. Rep. 19 (1836). 
119 Cf. DuPont v. DuPont, 32 Del. Ch. 413, 85 A.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1951). 
100 THE STATUTES OF TIIE MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 372 (Toulmin ed. 1807). 
101 l LAws OF LouISIANA AND MISSOURI 90. 
102 LAws OF TERRITORY OF LouISIANA 52 (Charless ed. 1808). 
103 The Louisiana law of 1807, in force when Missouri replaced Louisiana, was 
amended in 1817. See I LAws OF LouISIANA AND MISSOURI 517. 
10¼ The Mississippi law of 1803, in force when Alabama became a separate territory, 
appears in TOULMIN, DIGEST OF TIIE LAWS OF TIIE STATE OF Af.ABAMA 252 (1823). 
105 Portions of 1807 Louisiana Law and 1817 Missouri law appear in STEELE & 
M'CAMPBELL, LAws OF .ARKANSAS TERRITORY 218 (1935). 
106 PUBLIC Acrs OF TIIE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF TIIE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 80 
(Duval ed. 1839). 
107 I TENNESSEE LAws 645. 
108 MISS. HISTORICAL RECORDS SURVEY, SARGENT'S CODE 1799-1800, at ll2, 126 (1939). 
109 LoUISIANA LAws, 2d Sess., 1st Leg. 78, 80, 90, 94, 138 (1807). 
110 TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 104, at 254. 
111 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, § 13, 4 Stat. 167. 
112 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
66 , MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
history of legislative divorce, the Court held that power to grant 
divorces was included when Congress provided in the Organic 
Act (1848) that the legislative power of the Territory should "ex-
tend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States." Congress had declared 
in 1886 that territorial legislatures should not pass "local or special 
laws ... granting divorces,"113 leaving this type of jurisdiction ex-
clusively, to the courts. 
Though it was held after 1836 that jurisdiction of divorce was 
not included in the "common law" and "chancery" jurisdiction 
conferred on the superior courts by Congress, 114 it was assumed that 
this type of jurisdiction could be given to these courts by local 
legislation. This had always been done, and not disapproved. In 
Iowa, for instance, an act passed in 1840 provided that "the dis-
trict courts as courts of chancery" should have "original jurisdic-
tion in all cases of divorce and alimony and guardianship connected 
therewith."115 Divorce laws passed in unincorporated territories 
involved different grants of both legislative and judicial powers. 
For consideration of the validity of a divorce law of the Virgin 
Islands, see Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, decided by Su-
preme Court of the United States in 1955.116 
E. AnMIRALITY 
By "An Act to provide for the more convenient organization 
of the Courts of the United States" approved February 13, 1801,117 
Congress declared that one federal district should consist of "the 
territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio, and the 
Indiana territory, to be called the district of Ohio." This court 
was in operation only a short time, being abolished in 1802 by an 
act effective July 1.118 
In 1802 and 1803 actions to forfeit certain goods were com-
113 Act of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, 24 Stat. 170. 
114 Kenyon v. Kenyon, 3 Utah 431, 24 Pac. 829 (1861). 
m, IowA LAws 1839-1841, at 120. By an act approved June 23, 1874, Congress 
provided that the Utah probate courts should have "jurisdiction of suits for divorce for 
statutory causes concurrently with the district courts." Utah Judiciary Act of 1874, ch. 
469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253. 
116 349 U.S. 1 (1955). 
117 Ch. 4, § 4, 2 Stat. 89. 
118 Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. For instructions to the court's marshal, 
see 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 172. 
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menced by libels in an Indiana court of common pleas. 119 On 
appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court a question arose as to 
whether a locally-created common-law court had jurisdiction of 
this type of case. Writing from Vincennes, March 12, 1804, John 
Rice Jones, an attorney at that place, stated: 
"On examining the Revenue law I find that all penalties 
&c accruing by breach of that law are to be sued in any Court 
proper to try the same, which court by the whole tenor of 
the act applies to the judicial district (of the Federal Court) 
in which the penalty shall have accrued-this seems to 
imply an exclusive Jurisdiction in that Court; if that should 
be the case, the Court of Common Pleas can have none."120 
On March 3, 1805, Congress provided that the superior courts 
of the several territories of the United States, in which a district 
court had not been established, should, "in all cases in which the 
United States are concerned, have and exercise, within their re-
spective territories, the same jurisdiction and powers which are 
by law given to, or may be exercised by the district court of 
Kentucky district."121 By this act the superior courts of the terri-
tories were given exclusive, original jurisdiction of all crimes and 
offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States; of 
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which con-
cerned the United States; of seizures under laws of impost, navi-
gation and trade of the United States; and of suits for penalties 
and forfeitures under the laws of the United States. They were 
given concurrent, original jurisdiction of all suits in equity where 
the matter in dispute exceeded five hundred dollars and the United 
States was plaintiff, and of all actions at law where the matter in 
dispute amounted to one hundred dollars and the United States 
was plaintiff. 
The exception in the above statute indicates that Congress 
contemplated two types of territories-those in which "federal" 
district courts would be established, and those in which separate 
"federal" courts would not be established. The separate court for 
1111 For references to the papers in these cases, see Blume, Civil Procedure on the 
American Frontier, 56 MICH. L. REv. 161, 180-82, 223 (1957). 
120 Sibley Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit, Michigan. 
121 Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 338. The district court of Kentucky district, 
in. addition to a district court's jurisdiction, had jurisdiction of all cases, except appeals 
and writs of error, cognizable in a circuit court. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 10, I 
Stat. 77. Jurisdiction of the two federal courts is detailed in the Act of 1789. 
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Northwest and Indiana had been abolished,122 but in 1804 Con-
gress had established in Orleans "a district court" to consist of 
one judge who should have and exercise "the same jurisdiction and 
powers, which are by law given to, or may be exercised by the 
judge of Kentucky district."123 The jurisdiction of the Orleans 
judge was not limited to cases "in which the United States are 
concerned." 
A common type of admiralty case which concerned the United 
States was one in which a libel was filed to forfeit to the United 
States property seized under federal laws of impost, navigation, 
or trade.124 Where the seizure was made on the high seas or on 
waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons 
burden, the libel for forfeiture was a civil cause of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction, and trial was by the court. Where, how-
ever, the seizure was made on land or on waters not navigable from 
the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, the libel or informa-
tion for forfeiture was a proceeding at common law, according to 
the course of the English Exchequer, and trial by jury was re-
quired. 
The first case125 tried in the Supreme Court of Michigan 
(1805) was a libel to forfeit certain lumber landed at Detroit with-
out a permit. Although the seizure was made on land, the case was 
tried without a jury. No question was raised as to the propriety 
of treating it as a case within the admiralty jurisdiction of the 
court. Nor was any question raised as to whether the Great Lakes 
and the rivers connecting them were water navigable from the sea 
by vessels of ten or more tons burden within the meaning of the 
act of 1789. That the judges of Michigan sat as a court of admiralty 
is shown not only from the forms of their proceedings and from 
the fact they tried libels for forfeiture without juries, but also 
from a rule adopted in 1811 which fixed the time within which 
libels had to be filed in "admiralty cases." The records of the 
"admiralty side" of the court were separated from the other 
122 See note 118 supra. 
123 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 8, 2 Stat. 285. 
124 This paragraph and part of that following are from 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, xlvii (Blume ed. 1935), where 
brief source references are given. 
125 United States v. Boards, Planks &: Shingles claimed by Bissell &: Fitch, as reported 
in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 
48 (Blume ed. 1935). 
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records in 1815, and, according to a rule adopted at that time, the 
"admiralty side" was to sit on certain days "exclusively for the 
transaction of business as a circuit and district court of the United 
States." Though, as pointed out on another occasion, 126 the court 
on its "admiralty side" was not a court "of the United States," and 
the bulk of its business on that side not "admiralty," the practice 
of separate sittings and records was continued until the end of 
the territorial government (1836). 
According to an editorial in the Michigan Herald (Detroit) 
of March 29, 1826, a committee of Congress had reported doubt 
whether the judges of Michigan possessed "admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction," saying: "Legally speaking, however, there are no 
admiralty or maritime causes in the Territory." The writer of 
the editorial, after referring to the admiralty jurisdiction conferred 
by the Act of 1805, stated: 
"These fresh water seas are bordered by a foreign nation, and 
by different states of the Union, possessing jurisdictions in-
dependent of each other, and are actually 'navigable from 
the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen.' This latter 
circumstance may be no otherwise material than to show the 
extent and variety of the maritime transactions which do and 
may exist in relation to the commerce of the lakes. It is easy 
to conceive that seamen, ship builders, freighters, part owners, 
and others, including foreigners as well as citizens, may have 
rights and claims requiring the aid of a maritime and ad-
miralty court. Among the numerous causes requiring the 
same aid, we will mention that of salvage, which it is easy to 
conceive may arise on the lakes as well as on the ocean. 
. . . We respectfully submit to the consideration of the 
committee the propriety of reconsidering the subject, and 
if it should not be thought expedient to give us a District 
Court, at least to extend to the present judges maritime and 
admiralty jurisdiction, and leave them to decide what causes 
do and what do not come within that power." 
In 1818 Congress had provided that the powers of the "general 
court" of Alabama should extend to "all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction. "127 
120 See Blume, supra note 97, at 57. 
127 Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 127, 3 Stat. 468. 
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The "federal" jurisdiction given the superior courts of Florida 
(1822) differed from that conferred generally on the superior courts 
of all territories not having federal district courts. The latter was 
the same as Kentucky district, but limited to cases which "con-
cerned" the United States. In Florida it was the same as Kentucky 
district, but limited to "cases arising under the laws and constitu-
tion of the United States."128 In 1823 the territorial legislature 
undertook to confer on a municipal court jurisdiction over salvage. 
The validity of a judgment rendered by the court was upheld by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in American Insurance 
Co. v. Canter,129 and in doing so the Court rejected an argument 
that exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and maritime cases had 
been vested in the Florida superior courts. Chief Justice Marshall 
pointed out: (1) Admiralty cases do not arise under federal law, 
hence were not included in the grant of jurisdiction of cases arising 
under federal law. (2) Jurisdiction exercised by territorial courts 
is not part of the judicial power defined in Article III of the 
Constitution. Subsequent to the original judgment Congress had 
provided that the superior courts of Florida should have 
" . . . original and exclusive cognisance of all civil causes 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures 
under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States, 
whether such seizures be made on land or water, and of all 
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws 
of the United States; and original, but not exclusive juris-
diction, of all suits in which the United States shall be a 
party, whatever may be the amount in controversy in such 
causes and suits; and shall have and exercise appellate juris-
diction, in all civil causes, originating in the inferior courts 
of said territory, whatever may be the amount in contro-
versy. . . ."130 
The superior courts established in Wisconsin in 1836, and in 
fifteen later territories, were given "the same jurisdiction, in all 
cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States 
as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States." 
The courts were directed to use the first six days of each term, if 
128 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 8, 3 Stat. 752. 
120 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
130 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, 4 Stat. 164. 
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needed, for the trial of these cases. In Washington, where the 
words "and the laws of said Territory" had been inserted, after 
"laws of the United States," the supreme court was startled in 
1877 by a claim that the district courts had no admiralty jurisdic-
tion. Justice Greene noted: 
"Bench and bar have, without questioning, assumed that 
cases of admiralty and maritime cognizance arise either under 
the laws of the United States or under the laws of the Ter-
ritory. And upon this assumption, be it well grounded or 
otherwise, the Territorial District Courts have uniformly and 
continuously exercised in such cases the same jurisdiction as 
is exercised in like cases by the District courts of the United 
States."131 
The court's conclusion that a case arising under admiralty and 
maritime law was a case arising under the laws of the United States 
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
City of Panama in 1879.132 
F. BANKRUPTCY 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1841133 (repealed in 1843) conferred 
on the "supreme or superior courts" of the territories the same 
jurisdiction in bankruptcy as vested by the act in the "district 
court" of the United States. Similar jurisdiction was given to the 
territorial "supreme courts" by the Bankruptcy Act of 1867134 
(repealed 1878). This act was amended in 1874 by changing 
"supreme courts" to "district courts."135 In 1898 "the district 
courts of the United States in the several States, the supreme court 
of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the several Ter-
ritories, and the United States courts in the Indian Territory 
and the District of Alaska" were made courts of bankruptcy with 
"such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to 
exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings."136 
131 Phelps v. S.S. City of Panama, 1 Wash. Terr. 518, 523 (1877). 
132 101 U.S. 453 (1879). 
133 Ch. 9, § 16, 5 Stat. 448. 
134 Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 49, 14 Stat. 541. 
1315 Bankruptcy Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 16, 18 Stat. 182. See also Act of 
June 30, 1870, ch. 177, 16 Stat. 173. 
136 Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 545. 
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G. APPELLATE 
By an act adopted in 1795 the governor and judges of North-
west provided that persons aggrieved by the judgment of any court 
of record within the Territory might have a writ of error returnable 
to the General Court.137 In 1788 the General Court of Northwest 
had been authorized to hear probate appeals,138 and, from the 
beginning, the court's common law power to issue writs of error, 
certiorari, and habeas corpus had been recognized. In the territory 
south of the Ohio which became Tennessee in 1796 the "superior 
courts" held by the judges appointed by the national government 
were given "power and authority to grant writs of error for cor-
recting the errors of any inferior courts."139 The Mississippi judi-
cature act of 1799140 contained a provision for writs of error to 
local courts of record the same as, in fact copied from, the 
Northwest provision of 1795. A later Mississippi law adopted in 
1799 provided for a "supreme Court of Appeals" to be held by at 
least two of the superior judges with jurisdiction of cases "brought 
before them by appeal from any inferior court."141 One of the first 
acts of the governor and judges of Indiana (1801) was to frame "a 
law to regulate the practice of the General Courts upon Appeals 
and Writs of Error."142 
Under the nisi prius system established in Northwest in 1795,148 
one judge could try cases on circuit but could not make final de-
cisions or render judgment. Questions of law were decided by the 
central court, and any injustice corrected by the central court on 
motion. When this scheme was modified in Indiana in 1807 by 
authorizing the circuit judge to render final judgment and pass 
on motions for new trial, provision was made for review by a bill 
of exceptions.144 In Mississippi the act of 1805 that authorized 
each superior judge to hold a district court145 provided that 
the judges of the "Supreme Court" should have 
" ... full jurisdiction therein to hear and determine all causes 
137 l CHASE 148; PEASE 156. 
138 1 CHASE 96; PEASE 9. 
139 1 TENNESSEE LAws § 37, at 457. 
140 MISS. HISTORICAL RECORDS SURVEY, SARGENT'S CODE 1799-1800, at 7 (1939). 
141 Id. at 121. 
142 INDIANA LAws 3. 
143 I CHASE 147; PEASE 154. 
144 INDIANA LAws 230. 
145 Miss. Acts, 3d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. 55 (1805). 
1962] TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW 
brought before them by writ of error from any court of record 
in this Territory, all demurrers, points reserved at the trial, 
cases stated, special verdicts, motions in arrest of judgment, 
and for new trials, reserved for their consideration at any 
circuit court .... " 
73 
This provision, it will be noted, authorized review by the methods 
employed in a nisi prius system as well as by writ of error. 
The supreme-general-superior court originally established by 
the Northwest Ordinance was primarily a trial court with un-
limited common-law jurisdiction. Its appellate jurisdiction was not 
spelled out by Congress and was gradually developed by local 
legislation. In Mississippi the supreme court of 1805 was an ap-
pellate court, and court of chancery. By an act passed in 1814 the 
"Supreme Court of Mississippi" became "The Supreme Court of 
Errors and Appeals," with appellate jurisdiction only, to be ex-
ercised by writs of error, and other common-law writs.146 "Superior 
circuit courts" established in Michigan in 1833147 were circuit 
appellate courts held by the judges of the supreme court. In 1815 
Congress, for the first time, established a territorial court with 
appellate jurisdiction only-the ':Court of Appeals" of Illinois. 
This court was authorized to review the judgments and decrees of 
circuit courts held by individual superior judges, as well as of in-
ferior courts established in the Territory, by means of appeals and 
writs of error according to the principles of the common law.148 
The Florida "court of appeals" established by Congress in 1824149 
was given appellate jurisdiction only. Until regulated by the 
Florida legislature, writs of error to and appeals from the superior 
courts held by individual judges were to be taken and prosecuted 
as in "the next adjoining states." 
The standardized judicial system, first established in Wiscon-
sin in 1836, was headed by a supreme court which was to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction only; in no case removed to the supreme 
court was trial by jury to be allowed. Congress provided that 
146 STATUTES OF THE MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 200 (1816). 
147 3 MICHIGAN LAws 1020. 
148 Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 98, § 15, 3 Stat. 238; 17 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 139. This 
had been preceded by a similar territorial statute in 1814. See "A LAW Establishing a 
Supreme Court, and DOCUMENTS, published by a Joint Resolution of the LEGISLA-
TIVE COUNCIL, and House of Representatives, of Illinois Territory" reproduced in 17 
id. at 55-96. 
149 Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 163, § 4, 4 Stat. 46. 
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"writs of error, bills of exception, and appeals in chancery cases" 
should be allowed from the "final decisions" of the district courts, 
but did not expressly confer power to review the decisions of the 
inferior courts to be established by the local legislature. In the 
period before 1836 the "supreme" or "superior" judges appointed 
by the national government had reviewed the judgments of in-
ferior courts, and it was assumed that this might be authorized 
under the system first established in 1836. In Iowa, for example, 
an act passed in 1842150 provided that the supreme court should 
"exercise appellate jurisdiction only" and have 
". . . final and conclusive jurisdiction of all matters of ap-
peal, error, or complaint, from the judgments or decrees of 
any of the District Courts of this Territory, and from such 
other inferior courts as may hereafter be established by law, 
in all matters of law and equity." 
At this point it may be observed that the three-judge common-
law trial court originally established by the Northwest Ordinance, 
after becoming a court of almost unlimited original and appellate 
jurisdiction, ultimately exercised appellate jurisdiction only. The 
tradition of having all superior trial courts held by a bench of 
judges gave way to the idea that one judge may properly hold a 
trial court provided his decisions are subject to review by the 
other superior judges sitting in bank. The nisi prius system first 
established in Northwest, under which proceedings on circuit 
could be reviewed on simple motion made to the court in bank 
prior to judgment, was eventually replaced by a circuit system 
under which the circuit judges rendered final judgments subject 
to review by means of formal writs of error, bills of exception, and 
equity appeals. Under the nisi prius system the superior courts 
were in reality one court; they had later become separate courts. 
Although identity of personnel remained, and the appellate judges 
were experienced trial judges, even this identity of personnel was 
objected to. In some of the territories, after the number of judges 
had been increased, a judge could not sit in review of his own 
circuit court judgments.151 
150 LAws OF TIIE TERRITORY OF IowA, Session Commencing first Monday of Dec., 
ch. 47, at 34 (1841). 
151 Note 262 infra. 
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After Congress had authorized (1792) one of the "supreme or 
superior" judges of Northwest to hold a court "in the absence of 
the other judges,"152 Governor St. Clair (1794) reported to the 
Secretary of State that "many representations" had been made to 
him on the subject of permitting one judge to determine the whole 
property of the Territory "without the possibility of having that 
determination revised."153 The governor recommended that the 
law empowering one judge to hold a court be repealed, and some 
mode prescribed for having the decisions of the territorial supreme 
court reviewed by the "Federal Court." In February 1803 a writ 
of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the 
"General Court" of Northwest was quashed on the ground that it 
had not been authorized by act of Congress.154 
In December 1803 the congressional committee referred to 
under "Chancery" above, reported: 
"As to the second matter referred to them for their in-
quiry [ expediency of allowing writs of error and appeals from 
the judgments and decrees of the judges of the United States 
within the Indiana and other territories], the committee beg 
leave to observe, that the attainment of a uniformity of de-
cision in any section of country subject to the same laws and 
usages, is one of the principal objects of the institution of a 
Supreme Court, with appellate jurisdiction. Where there are 
many courts dispersed over a country, though subject to the 
same laws and usages, yet, without one common tribunal, 
which shall have power to revise and correct the judgments 
and decrees of the inferior courts, their decisions will be 
various and contradictory. But to attain this uniformity of 
decision in each Territorial Government, it is not necessary 
to allow ·writs of error or appeals to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, because each Territory has a supreme court 
(relatively speaking) within itself, which is composed of three 
judges and has, or may have appellate jurisdiction over all 
others erected in the Territory, whereby it may preserve that 
uniform rule of decision so desirable. 
"Correctness, or propriety of decision, is the only other 
1112 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 4, 1 Stat. 286. 
1113 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 499. 
111( Clark v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212 (1803). 
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object the attainment of which can be aided by allowing writs 
of error and appeals from the Territorial courts to the Su-
preme Court of the United States. The committee are not 
informed nor do they believe, that there is any unusual want 
of confidence in the courts of the Territories. They are 
aware that hardships and injustice will result to individuals 
in some instances from the erroneous decision of those courts, 
but it has not occurred to them that an appeal will insure in-
fallible relief. Infallibility is not the attribute of any earthly 
tribunal. So vast is the distance from the Territorial courts 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, that the mischief 
resulting from the necessary delay, expense, and inconven-
ience of prosecuting or defending writs of error and appeals 
cannot, in the opinion of the committee, be compensated by 
any advantage to be derived from the revision of the courts 
of the Territories, by the Supreme Court of the United 
States."155 
After Congress had conferred (1805) on the superior territorial 
courts same-as-federal jurisdiction in cases concerning the United 
States,156 the above committee's well-stated opinion of the func-
tions of appellate review (1. To unify the law. 2. To see that 
justice is done in individual cases.) was still valid, but its conclu-
sion could not stand. A territorial supreme court might unify 
territorial law in state-type cases, and see that justice was done in 
individual cases, but could not unify the law applicable to federal-
type cases. The Act of 1805 provided for these cases that "writs of 
error and appeals shall lie, from decisions therein, to the supreme 
court [of the United States], for the same causes, and under the 
same regulations, as from the said district court of Kentucky dis-
trict." Appeal from the "General Court" of Alabama in admiralty 
and maritime cases was authorized in 1818.157 And when the 
superior courts of Florida were given same-as-federal jurisdiction 
of "cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United 
States" (1823),158 provision was made for appeals and writs of error 
to the United States court, as was again done when the same-as-
federal jurisdiction was expanded in 1826.159 The district court 
155 ANNALS OF CoNG., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 1578 (1803). 
156 See note 121 supra. 
157 Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 127, 3 Stat. 468. 
158 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 8, 3 Stat. 752. 
159 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, § 5, 4 ?tat. 165. 
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of Orleans (established 1804) was a federal court subject to review 
without special provision.160 
In the period before 1836 review by the Supreme Court of the 
United States of state-type territorial cases was authorized in a few 
instances-decisions of the "highest tribunal" of Michigan in cases 
exceeding $1,000 (1825);161 of the "superior court" of Arkansas in 
certain land cases (1824),162 and of cases exceeding $1,000 (1828);168 
of the "superior courts" of Florida in cases exceeding $1,000 
(1823).m 
The organic acts of Wisconsin (1836) and Iowa (1838), after 
authorizing review of district court decisions by the territorial 
supreme court in both state-type and federal-type cases, provided 
for "writs of error and appeals" from the final decisions of the 
territorial supreme court to the Supreme Court of the United 
States in cases involving more than $1,000. Under the organic acts 
of Oregon (1848) and Washington (1853) the minimum amount 
in controversy had to exceed $2,000 except in cases questioning 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. That the 
provision for Wisconsin and Iowa became the standardized or 
established provision is shown by section 1909 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1873-74: 
"Writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the 
supreme court of either of the Territories of New Mexico, 
Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Wyo-
ming, shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in the same manner and under the same regulations 
as from the circuit courts of the United States, where the 
value of the property or the amount in controversy . . . ex-
ceeds one thousand dollars . . . . " 
Special provision was made for review of decisions "upon writs of 
habeas corpus." Review of specified Utah criminal cases was au-
thorized in 1874.165 An act applicable to all territories passed in 
1885166 increased the jurisdictional amount to $5,000, but ex-
160 Sere v. Pitot, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 
(6 Cranch) 307 (1810); Morgan v. Callender, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 370 (1808). 
161 Act of Feb. 5, 1825, ch. 6, § 5, 4 Stat. 81 
162 Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 173, § 2, 4 Stat. 53. 
168 Act of April 17, 1828, ch. 29, § 5, 4 Stat. 262. 
164 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 7, 3 Stat. 752. 
165 Territory of Utah Judiciary Act of 1874, ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253. 
166 Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 355, 23 Stat. 443. 
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cepted cases either involving patents and copyrights,167 or question-
ing the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States. When 
the circuit courts of appeal were established in 1891,168 these courts 
were authorized to review the decisions of the territorial courts 
"and for that purpose the several Territories shall, by orders of the 
Supreme Court, to be made from time to time, be assigned to par-
ticular circuits." 
An act of Congress passed in 1874169 directed that territorial 
jury cases be reviewed by "writ of error"; other cases by "appeal" 
"Provided, That on appeal, instead of the evidence at large, 
a statement of the facts of the case in the nature of a special 
verdict, and also the rulings of the court on the admission or 
rejection of evidence when excepted to, shall be made and 
certified by the court below, and transmitted to the Supreme 
Court [of the United States] together with the transcript of 
the proceedings and judgment or decree." 
Substitution of appeals in the nature of writs of error indicates that 
Congress was concerned with the "attainment of a uniformity of 
decision" (report of congressional committee of 1803),170 and 
not with the "correctness or propriety of decision" (justice in 
particular cases) referred to in the report. By including in the 
scheme of federal review state-type as well as federal-type cases, 
Congress tightened the control of the national government over 
its colonies. 
APPOINTMENT, TENURE, AND REMOVAL OF SUPERIOR 
COURT JUDGES 
The congressional act of 1789 that adapted the Northwest 
Ordinance to the Constitution of the United States provided that 
the President should appoint officers which by the Ordinance were 
to be appointed "by the United States in Congress assembled," and 
that where Congress might, "by the said ordinance," revoke any 
commission or remove from any office, the President might do the 
same.171 The Ordinance had provided that the territorial gover-
161 The Trade-Mark Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 17, 33 Stat. 728, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 
(1958), gave tbe territorial courts original jurisdiction of "all suits at law or in equity 
respecting trade marks." 
168 Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 13, 26 Stat. 829. 
169 Act of April 7, 1874, ch. 80, § 2, 18 Stat. 27. 
170 See note 155 supra. 
171 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 53. 
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nor's commission should continue three years, "unless sooner re-
voked by Congress"; that the Secretary's commission continue four 
years, "unless sooner revoked." Though nothing was said in the 
Ordinance about revoking the commissions of the judges, which 
were to continue "during good behaviour," Attorney General 
Cushing argued to the Supreme Court, in United States v. Guth-
rie172 in 1854, that as the old Congress possessed power to remove 
for misbehavior, this "precise power" was vested in the President 
by the congressional act of 1789. It should be noted, however, 
that when charges of misconduct were made against Judge Turner 
of Northwest in 1796,173 the President, instead of considering the 
charges himself, instructed the Secretary of State "to give orders 
to Governor St. Clair to take the necessary measures for bringing 
that officer to a fair trial, respecting those charges, before the court 
of that Territory, according to the laws of the land." 
The case before the Supreme Court in 1854 involved the re-
moval of a Minnesota territorial judge before the end of his four-
year term. Whether the President had power to remove a territorial 
judge was argued at length, but not decided. Justice McLean, dis-
senting, was strongly of the opinion that the President had no such 
power. After reviewing the provisions of the several organic acts, 
McLean pointed out that only in two were there provisions for 
removal, "but whether this language was the result of accident, 
or design" it did not apply to the other territories. Referring to 
the act of 1789, he declared: 
". . . Under the ordinance, as above stated, the judges were 
appointed during good behavior, while all the other officers 
were appointed for a term of years, unless sooner removed. 
"If congress have the power to create the territorial courts, 
of which no one doubts, it has the power to fix the tenure of 
office. This being done, the President has no more power to 
remove a territorial judge, than he has to repeal a law. The 
duties of a judge of a territory are discharged as independ-
ently, and as free from executive control, as are the duties of 
a judge of this court. This territorial judicial power was in-
tended to be a check upon the executive power. And it would 
be inconsistent with the principles of our government, for the 
judges to be subject to removal by the executive. 
172 United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 290 (1854). 
173 3 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF RF.PRESENTATIVES 983 (1907). 
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"This is a great question, although it can only affect, as 
now maintained, the territorial bench. And I regret that, from 
the want of jurisdiction, in the opinion of my brethren, they 
are not required to express an opinion as to the power as-
serted."1H 
"An act regulating the Tenure of certain Civil Offices" passed 
by Congress in 1867175-amended in 1869176-provided for the sus-
pension and removal of officers appointed by the President "by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, except judges of the 
United States courts." Whether the exception included territorial 
judges was considered by the Supreme Court in two cases decided 
in 1891-McAllister v. United States111 and Wingard v. United 
States178-one involving an Alaska judge; the other a judge of 
Washington Territory. After elaborate argument and full con-
sideration the Court held that territorial courts were not "courts 
of the United States," and assumed, according to Justice Harlan, 
that the words "judges of the courts of the United States," were 
used with reference to the "recognized distinction between courts 
of the United States and merely territorial or legislative courts." 
Justice Field, dissenting, did not agree that because territorial 
courts were not constitutional courts, they were not courts of the 
United States "in any sense" and therefore "bereft of that inde-
pendence which is deemed so essential in the judges of the courts 
under the Constitution." Independence of the judiciary was "a 
great question" although only the "territorial bench" was involved, 
and the pertinent statutory provisions had been repealed in 1887.179 
When impeachment of Judge Turner of Northwest was under 
consideration in 1796, Attorney General Lee declared that trial 
before the Senate would be impracticable because of "the expense, 
the delay, the certain difficulty, if not impossibility of obtaining 
the attendance [at Philadelphia] of the witnesses who reside in the 
Territory northwest of the Ohio, about the distance of 1,500 
miles."180 In 1833 a committee of Congress was of the opinion that a 
174 United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 312 (1854). 
175 Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (March 2, 1867). 
176 Act of April 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6. 
177 141 U.S. 174 (1891). 
178 141 U.S. 201 (1891). Appended to the dissenting opinion at 203 is a list 
exhibiting the terms of the judges in all the territories. 
179 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. 
180 3 HINDS, op. cit. supra note 173, § 2486, at 982. 
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territorial judge was "not a proper subject of trial by impeachment" 
under article II of the Constitution, not being an officer "of the 
United States."181 The committee called attention to the fact that 
the Arkansas judge in question had been appointed for only four 
years, and might be removed by the President at any time. Earlier 
attempts to have territorial judges impeached had failed for one 
reason or another.182 Whether territorial judges might be removed 
by impeachment was the subject of an opinion given by Attorney 
General Grundy to the House Committee on Territories in 1839.183 
Under consideration was a bill to amend the Wisconsin Organic 
Act of 1838. This opinion reads in part: 
"Congress has in most cases limited the tenure of office 
of Territorial judges to four years. This could not be done 
were they judges under or provided for by the Constitution, 
because by that instrument the tenure is during good be-
havior. It should be noticed that Congress has imposed this 
limitation of four years, not in a single instance only, but in 
many. It has been imposed in the Territories embraced within 
the limits of the original States, where the Territory has been 
ceded to the General Government, and Territorial govern-
ments have been created therein. It has also been done in the 
Territories purchased by the United States from foreign na-
tions. I think these acts clearly prove the sense of Congress 
to be that Territorial judges are not judges under the Consti-
tution, but are mere creatures of legislation. 
"I have said that the Supreme Court of the United States 
have also decided upon this point. In the case of the American 
Insurance Company and others v. Canter, reported in first 
Peters, the court very distinctly recognized the opinion above 
expressed, and convey their views in the following strong 
language: 'These courts (meaning Territorial courts), then, 
are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power 
conferred by the Constitution on the General Government 
can be deposited; they are incapable of receiving it; they are 
legislative courts, created in virtue of the general rights of 
sovereignty.' 
"The only remaining inquiry is as to the liability of Terri-
181 3 HINDS, op. cit. supra note 173, at 991. 
182 Id., § 2486 (Judge George Turner, Northwest, 1796) § 2487 (Judge Peter B. 
Bruin, Mississippi, 1808), § 2488 (Judge Harry Toulmin, Mississippi, 1811), § 2490 
(Judge Joseph L. Smith, Florida, 1825 & 1826). 
183 Id.,§ 2022, at 359. 
82 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
torial judges to impeachment under the Constitution. The 
fourth section of the second article of the Constitution is in 
these words: 'The President, Vice-President, and all civil of-
ficers of the United States shall be removed from office on im-
peachment and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.' 
"If the construction of the Constitution be correct, as I 
suppose it is, that these judges are not constitutional but legis-
lative judges, I can see nothing in the Constitution which 
would warrant their being embraced by the expression, 'and 
all civil officers of the United States.' They are not civil officers 
of the United States in the constitutional meaning of the 
phrase. They are merely Territorial officers, and therefore, 
in my opinion, not subject to impeachment and trial before 
the Senate of the United States." 
The outline of the judicial systems prior to 1836, above,184 
shows that prior to 1836 the superior judges of the territories es-
tablished in the area relinquished by England in 1783 were to 
serve during good behavior; those of the territories created out of 
the Louisiana and Florida purchases, to serve four years. The 
reasons why in Michigan good behavior tenure was changed to 
four-year tenure in 1824 are indicated by a letter written by James 
D. Doty (a young lawyer in Detroit) to Henry R. Schoolcraft, 
October 25, 1822: 
"The good work has commenced here. U udges] Wood-
ward & Griffin are likely to have something happen to them. 
If you take the Detroit Gazette you will perceive their con-
duct for years past is presented to them for their inspection-
A petition will probably be presented to Congress praying for 
a repeal of the Ordinance under which they hold their offices. 
This is a modest way of turning a man out of office."181, 
By an act approved March 3, 1823, Congress provided that the 
tenure of the Michigan judges should be limited to four years, and 
that on February I, 1824, and every four years thereafter the office 
of each judge should become vacant.186 Judge Griffin resigned;187 
184 Page 45 supra. 
18G 11 TERRITORIAL p APERS 270. 
186 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 36, § 3, 3 Stat. 769. 
187 11 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 444. A letter opposing his reappointment had been sent to 
the President by members of the Detroit bar. Id. at 434. 
1962] TERRITORIAL COURTS AND· LAW 83 
Judge Woodward was not re-appointed.188 After his letter to 
Schoolcraft, and before the act of Congress was approved, Doty 
was appointed "additional" territorial judge, to hold office "during 
his good behaviour, or during the existence of the [territorial] 
Government."189 Failing reappointment in 1832 he wrote the 
Secretary of State:190 
"I deem it my duty to inform the government, that by 
my commission issued by the President on the 17th. day of 
February 1823, I am entitled 'to have and to hold the said 
office,' 'during good behaviour.' I have taken the advice of legal 
gentlemen who concur in the opinion that my commission was 
not affected by the Acts of Congress subsequently passed." 
Doty's claim was not sustained, but it is of interest to note that 
good-behavior tenure was restored when Wisconsin was created 
out of Michigan in 1836. 
When Iowa was created out of Wisconsin in 1838, "good be-
haviour" tenure was changed to "four years" and this became the 
standard provision. The adoption of short-term tenure for all 
territorial judges made it possible for the President to get rid of 
an unsatisfactory judge by not re-appointing him. Furthermore, 
the President was expressly authorized to remove judges appointed 
for Alaska (1900; 1948);191 Puerto Rico (1900);192 Hawaii (1900; 
1950);193 Canal Zone (1934; 1938);194 Guam (1950);195 Virgin Is-
lands (1954).196 
REGULATION OF SUPERIOR COURT PROCEDURE 
The Northwest Ordinance (1787), after conferring on the 
superior judges "a common law jurisdiction," guaranteed to the 
188 For evidence that Woodward was a victim of misrepresentations, see I1 TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS 441-44, and W'ooDFORD, A LIFE OF JUSTICE WOODWARD-MR. JEFFERSON'S DISCIPLE, 
ch. IX {1953). 
189 11 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 344, 345. 
100 12 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 521, 522, 
191 Alaska Civil Code, ch. 786, § 10, 31 Stat. 325 (1900), as amended, ch. 646, § 13, 62 
Stat. 987 (1948). 
102 Puerto Rico Civil Code, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 84 (1900), 48 U.S.C. § 863 (1958). 
193 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 82, 31 Stat. 157, as amended, ch. 250, 64 
Stat. 216 (1950). 
194 Panama Canal Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 370, 28 U.S.C. § 1294(3) (1958); Canal 
Zone Code, ch. 667, 28 U.S.C. § 610 (1958). 
105 Organic Act of Guam of 1950, ch. 512, § 24, 64 Stat. 390, 48 U.S.C. § 1424b {1958). 
196 Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, ch. 558, § 24, 68 Stat. 506 (1954), 
48 u.s.c. § 1614 (1958). 
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inhabitants trial by jury, and "proceedings according to the course 
of the common law." Two general questions had to be answered: 
(1) Were the territorial courts to be governed by the same proce-
dural regulations as governed the federal courts? (2) If not, was 
local regulation to be by common law, statute, or rules of court? 
The Northwest court was established prior to the federal courts, 
and was not a court "of the United States." That this was recog-
nized by the governor and judges of Northwest is shown by the fact 
that they adopted several statutes containing provisions similar to 
those enacted by Congress to govern the federal courts.197 
As long as the judges of Northwest controlled local legislation198 
(the governor having but one vote and no veto),199 there was little 
or no occasion for careful consideration of the line which should 
separate regulation of procedure by statute from regulation of pro-
cedure by rule of court. A review of Northwest laws published 
1795-1798 gives some indication where the line was drawn: 
"The governor and judges of the Northwest Territory 
published thirty-eight laws in 1795, none in 1796 or 1797, and 
eleven in 1798. Approximately one half of these laws con-
tained provisions which, to some extent, either defined the 
jurisdiction of the General Court or regulated the manner in 
which it should exercise its judicial power. Certain matters, 
viz., the organization of the court, its jurisdiction, the times 
and places of its sessions, the fees allowed to the judges and 
the clerk, and the admission of attorneys, were fully regulated 
by statute. Process was regulated to some extent. The rules of 
pleading, practice, and evidence were regulated so little that 
it seems safe to say that they continued as at common law ex-
cept as modified by the General Court."200 
In 1800, "for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an 
uniformity in the practice of the several courts throughout the 
territory," the Northwest Assembly enacted: 
101 An act regarding evidence adopted in 1791 (1 CHASE 110; PEASE 44) was adopted 
about a year after a similar act had been passed by Congress applicable to "every court 
within the United States." Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. An act regarding 
pleading in person or by attorney published in 1792 (1 CHASE 126; PEASE 88) differed 
somewhat from the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92. 
198 See "Legislative Agencies and Power" supra. For details of this arrangement, 
see Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier, 60 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1962). 
100 See 2 ST. CLAIR PAPERS 72, 73-74; 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 204, 206-07. 
2-00 3 TM.NSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1814-1824, 
xvii (Blume ed. 1938). 
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"That it is hereby made the duty of the judges of the 
general court, to compile a system of rules for the govern-
ment of the general and circuit courts, and they are hereby 
required, on or before the first Monday of August next, to 
cause a copy of such rules to be delivered to the clerk of each 
of the said courts. Provided always, That the said rules shall 
be consistent with the constitution, laws and ordinances of the 
United States and the acts of this territory; which rules may 
be revised and amended by the said judges, when and as often 
as occasion may require .... "201 
85 
Here is clear indication of the legislators' belief that they had 
power to regulate the proceedings of the court established by Con-
gress and that any regulations made by the court must be consistent 
with territorial statutes as well as with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States.202 In Michigan the territorial supreme court 
made extensive use of its rule-making power, but always recog-
nized, seemingly, that rules of court must not conflict with statu-
tory law.2os 
After the congressional act of 1805 had conferred on the 
superior courts some of the jurisdiction exercised by the federal 
court of Kentucky district, the Michigan superior judges sat on 
certain days "exclusively for the transaction of business as a circuit 
and district court of the United States," and at these sessions under-
took to follow rules of practice prescribed by Congress for the 
courts of the United States.204 In Mississippi, Judge Rodney "was 
convinced that his territorial supreme court was a district and 
circuit court of the United States."205 Judge Toulmin, on the 
other hand, was "satisfied" that his separate superior court was 
"merely a territorial court authorized like state courts to entertain 
201 l CHASE 307. 
202 A Mississippi statute enacted in 1805 provided that the supreme court should 
have "power and authority to ordain and establish all necessary rules of practice for 
the orderly conducting and managing of business in the said court and in the respective 
circuit courts, as also in the offices of the respective clerks, and to appoint days for 
taking rules in said offices: Provided such rules be not contrary to the ordinance and 
laws for the government of this Territory." MISS. ACTS, 3d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. § 9, at 
55 (1805). Similar rule-making power was conferred on the supreme or superior courts 
of all the territories involved in the present study with the possible exception of 
Southwest. 
203 See Rule-Making Power and its Exercise in 3 BLUME, op. cit. supra note 200, at 
xi-xxxiii. 
204 Id. at xxxiii-xxxv. 
205 HAMILTON, ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw OF TIIE FRONTIER: THOMAS RODNEY &: His 
TERRITORIAL CAsEs 95, 98 (1953). 
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certain suits also belonging to the federal jurisdiction."206 Having 
so held, he followed a local venue law in a case involving the 
United States. Concerning the power of the local legislature to 
regulate the business of the court established by Congress, Judge 
Toulmin observed: 
"Indeed the territorial judges have always been regarded 
as much more subject to legislative controul, than this idea 
would lead one to believe. Whether this assumption of power 
on the part of the territorial legislature, has arisen from the 
reason & nature of the. case, or from the clause in the ordi-
nance which gives them the power of 'regulating and defining 
the powers and duties of magistrates and other civil officers'; 
I know not:-but certain it is, that they have uniformly ex-
ercised this regulating controul. The ordinance provided 
merely for one court:-the general assembly have made as 
many courts as counties. The ordinance gave to the judges, 
simply a 'common law' jurisdiction. The general assembly 
have formed out of the same materials, courts of chancery." 
A Digest of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the Territory 
of Michigan published in 18212°7 contained divisions headed 
"Equity" and "Admiralty." The latter, after directing "that 
separate Minutes and Records be kept, by a separate clerk, of the 
transactions of this Court, sitting as a Circuit and District Court 
of the United States," provided that "Every Counsellor and Attor-
ney, on the common law side, shall be, of course, a proctor on the 
admiralty side of the Court; and the rules at the common law side, 
when applicable, shall be observed on the admiralty side of the 
Court." In 1827 the Michigan Legislative Council provided that 
the supreme court of the territory should have jurisdiction "in 
cases properly cognizable by a court of chancery, in which a plain, 
adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had at law," and that 
the proceedings in the court, where not regulated by the statutes 
of the Territory, should be regulated "by the judges thereof, con-
forming to the rules and proceedings established by courts of 
chancery in England, so far as the same shall be consistent with the 
laws and Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the 
Territory of Michigan."208 Federal Equity Rule XXXIII of 1822 
had provided: 
206 6 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 516, 525. 
201 Reprinted in 4 BLUME, op. cit. supra note 200, at 515-32. 
208 2 MICHIGAN LAws 517. 
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"In all cases where the rules prescribed by this court, or 
by the circuit court, do not apply, the practice of the circuit 
court shall be regulated by the practice of the high court of 
chancery in England."209 
It is clear that the council assumed that the territorial court was not 
governed by the federal rules, but should be governed by similar 
rules adopted in the Territory. 
In 1863, after the New York Code of Procedure (1848) had 
been "enacted in substance, and often in its very letter" in many 
of the territories,210 the Supreme Court of the United States in a 
case coming up from Nebraska held that a territorial court sitting 
in chancery was governed by the same statutes and court rules as 
governed the federal courts.211 Three Justices dissented, impressed 
by a contention that the territorial court was "not a court under 
the Constitution, nor organized under the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
but by the legislature of the Territory under the organic act." The 
Nebraska code had been copied from Ohio but had retained a 
formal distinction between law and equity. In a case coming up 
from Montana, where procedural union of law and equity had 
been provided, the Supreme Court of the United States held in 
1871 that trial of a case of equitable jurisdiction could not be con-
ducted with a jury as a trial at common law.212 Justice Bradley 
observed: 
"From the provisions of the organic law, which have been 
referred to in the argument, it is apparent that the Territorial 
legislature has no power to pass any law in contravention of 
the Constitution of the United States, or which shall deprive 
the Supreme and District Courts of the Territory of chancery 
as well as common-law jurisdiction. 
"This case was clearly a case of chancery jurisdiction, and 
one necessarily requiring equitable, as distinguished from 
legal, relief."213 
In Hornbuckle v. Toombs (1874),214 also a Montana case, the only 
errors assigned were "based on the intermingling of legal and equi-
table remedies in one form of action." After a careful review of the 
200 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xxi (1822). 
210 HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING § 84, at 88 (1897). 
211 Orchard v. Hughes, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 73 (1863). 
212 Dunphy v. Kleinsmith, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 610 (1871). 
213 Id. at 614. 
2H 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648 (1874). 
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whole subject the Court disapproved its previous decisions. Mr. 
Justice Bradley stated: 
"Now, here is nothing which declares, as the Process Act 
of 1792 did declare, that the jurisdicti_ons of common law and 
chancery shall be exercised separately, and by distinct forms 
and modes of proceeding. The only provision is, that the 
courts shall possess both jurisdictions. . . . 
"A clause in the thirteenth section of the act, however, 
has been referred to, by which it is declared 'that the Consti-
tution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally 
inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the 
said Territory of Montana as elsewhere in the United States;' 
and it is argued that by virtue of this enactment, all regula-
tions respecting judicial proceedings which are contained in 
any of the acts of Congress, are imported into the practice 
of the Territorial courts. But this proposition is not tenable. 
Laws regulating the proceedings of the United States courts 
are of specific application, and are, in truth and in fact, locally 
inapplicable to the courts of a Territory .... 
"It is true that the District Courts of the Territory are, by 
the organic act, invested with the same jurisdiction, in all 
cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, as is vested in the Circuit and District Courts of the 
United States; and a portion of each term is directed to be 
appropriated to the trial of causes arising under the said Con-
stitution and laws. Whether, when acting in this capacity, the 
said courts are to be governed by any of the regulations affect-
ing the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, is not 
now the question .... To avoid question and controversy as 
to the modes of proceeding in such cases, where not already 
settled by law, perhaps additional legislation would be desir-
able."215 
In 1874 Congress declared "that it shall not be necessary in any of 
the courts of the several Territories of the United States to exercise 
separately the common-law and chancery jurisdictions vested in 
said courts; and that the several codes and rules of practice adopted 
in said Territories respectively, in so far as they authorize a min-
gling of said jurisdictions or a uniform course of proceeding in all 
cases whether legal or equitable, be confirmed."216 
215 Id. at 653-56. 
216 Act of April 7, 1874, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 27. 
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Whether, when sitting to try cases arising under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, territorial courts should follow 
federal procedure-a question raised but left unanswered in H <Jrn-
buckle v. Toombs-was involved in the Washington admiralty 
case (1877) previously noted. 
"What rules are to govern the exercise of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction by our courts? ... 
"Our answer ... is, that the rules of admiralty, promul-
gated by the Supreme Court of the United States as far as they 
can be applied, are to regulate the procedure in cases of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction in the courts of this Terri-
tory."211 
The several bankruptcy acts, referred to under "Bankruptcy" 
above, prescribed the procedure to be followed. It seems clear that 
all courts mentioned in the acts, including territorial, were to be 
governed by the same procedural statutes and rules. 
Regulations fixing the times and places of holding superior 
courts were complicated by frontier conditions, and will be noted 
briefly under "Influence of the Frontier" below. 
INFLUENCE OF THE FRONTIER 
After interviewing a number of lawyers at Cincinnati in De-
cember 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville, a French magistrate studying 
American democracy, wrote: 
"A defective English law (and there are many) is im-
ported into America by the first emigrants. They modify it, 
adapt it after a fashion to their social condition; but they still 
retain for it a superstitious respect, and are unable to rid 
themselves of it entirely. The second emigration takes place; 
these same men plunge once again into the wilderness. This 
time the law is modified in such a way that it has almost lost 
the stamp of its origin. But it requires still a third emigration 
before it ceases to exist."218 
Referring to the first and second emigrations in more general terms 
he added: 
"The Europeans, on coming to America, left behind them, 
217 Phelps v. S.S. City of Panama, 1 Wash. Terr. 518, 529-30 (1877). See text at note 
131 supra. 
218 PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE &: BEAUMONT IN AMERICA 567 (1938). 
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in large part, the traditions of the past, the institutions and 
customs of their fatherland; they built a society which has 
analogies with those of Europe, but which at bottom is radic-
ally different. In the last forty years, from the midst of that 
new society has gone out another swarm of emigrants march-
ing west, as once their fathers came to the coasts of New 
England and Maryland. Like them, abandoning the ideas of 
their fatherland together with the soil that bore them, they 
are founding in the valleys of the Mississippi a new society." 
Tocqueville had been told that there were already 5,000,000 in-
habitants in the Mississippi valley, and his informant had pre-
dicted that within twenty years a major portion of the population 
of the United States would be west of the Ohio. Law that had been 
gradually adapted over a period of almost 200 years to the condi-
tions of the Atlantic colonies and states was undergoing its second 
major adaptation. The third emigration (out of the Mississippi 
Valley to the West Coast) was not foreseen-only the consequences 
of a third plunge into the wilderness. 
From the information given him at Cincinnati, Tocqueville 
was able to see in the second emigration a development of law equal 
in importance to that which had taken place in the Atlantic colo-
nies and states. Whether due to "the influence of the frontier" or 
to "the loss of ancestral baggage while on the march,"2111 the law 
of the Atlantic society, adapted from England, was being changed 
to meet the conditions of the Mississippi Valley. If a third emigra-
tion should take place the stamp of English origin would be lost. 
That his information as to what was occurring in the course of the 
second emigration was correct may be assumed from the fact that 
among the lawyers interviewed by him at Cincinnati were Justice 
McLean of the United States Supreme Court; Bellamy Storer, 
referred to as "the leading lawyer of Cincinnati"; and Salmon P. 
Chase, later to be Chief Justice of the United States, and then en-
gaged in editing the Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwest Terri-
tory.220 
Ever since Professor Turner's paper on the "Significance of the 
Frontier in American History" (1893), attempts have been made to 
find in his "frontier theory" an explanation of the development of 
American law. Legal as well as political "abuses" have been at-
tributed to frontier thought and action. 
219 Id. at 568. 
220 Id. at 555. 
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"In particular many crudities in judicial organization and 
procedure are demonstrably legacies of the frontier. Moreover 
the spirit of American law of the nineteenth century was sensi-
bly f!.ffected by the spirit of the pioneer."221 
This statement by Pound was not supported by a bill of particulars, 
and a search for the frontier "crudities" which constitute our 
"legacies" has thus far proved fruitless. 
The Northwest Ordinance (1787) did not prescribe when or 
where the supreme-general-superior court should hold its sessions, 
leaving this to the court itself or to the territorial legislature made 
up, at first, of the governor and judges. Assuming this power, the 
legislative board in 1788 provided that the court "hold pleas, civil 
and criminal, at four certain periods or terms, in each and every 
year in such counties as the judges shall from time to time deem 
most conducive to the general good."222 By 1790, four counties had 
been organized, and the court was required to hold a yearly session 
in each county at specified times.223 The size of the court's circuit 
can be visualized by recalling that local courts for the four counties 
were held at Marietta, Cincinnati, Vincennes, Cahokia, Prairie du 
Rochers, and Kaskaskias. A proposal by judges Symmes and Tur-
ner that the holding of sessions of the court in the two western 
counties be left to the discretion of the judges was rejected by 
Acting Governor Sargent.224 
"To go" their immense circuit in 1790, judges Symmes and 
Turner purchased a boat which was later paid for out of the 
national treasury.225 It appears, however, that "the boat belonging 
to the civil government" was taken by the military.226 After refer-
ring to the loss of the boat, Acting Governor Sargent reported to 
the Secretary of War in December 1792: 
"From this Cause the general Courts of Justice are not 
yet known in the two western Counties and have held only a 
single Term in Washington County which, with great reason, 
is complained of by the people; the grand Inquest for the 
body of the County of St. Clair have gone so far as formally to 
221 Pound, The Pioneers and the Common Law, 27 W. VA. L.Q. I, 3-4 (1920). See 
also POUND, THE SPIRIT OF TIIE COMMON LAW 112-38 (1921). 
222 See I CHASE 97; PEASE II. 
223 See I CHASE 107; PEASE 35. 
224 !! TERRITORIAL PAPERS 317. 
225 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 7, I Stat. 286. 
226 !! TERRITORIAL PAPERS 388. 
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present this Grievance to me requesting that I should lay it 
before the President-
"It would be impracticable Sir for the Judges to perform 
the Circuits without Escortes and it is so very seldom they are 
to be obtained that their Honours (when in the Territory) 
are obliged to be in a manner stationary."227 
Another reason why sessions of the supreme-general-superior 
court were not regularly held was lack of a quorum. Often two, 
and sometimes three, of the judges were absent from the territory 
at a time. To meet this situation Congress provided in 1792228 that 
any one of the "supreme or superior" judges "in the absence of the 
other judges" might hold a court. Commenting on this provision 
in 1794 Governor St. Clair wrote the Secretary of State: 
"Many representations, Sir, have been made to me on this 
Subject-the people, very generally, think it an unsafe Situa-
tion which they are in; and indeed, taking the matter ab-
stractly, it cannot be thought very eligible, that the whole 
property of the Country which may [be] the subject of legal 
dispute, should be governed by the determination of a single 
Judge, without the possibility of having that determination 
revised.' '229 
In an attempt to meet the needs of the western counties, the 
governor and judges of Northwest adopted in 1795 a law providing 
that issues formed in the General Court be tried in the county 
"whence the cause was removed" by the superior judges "or any 
one of them" who were directed "if occasion require, to go on cir-
cuit, twice in every year, into the counties of St. Clair and Knox."230 
The judges were authorized to do whatever necessary for the trial 
of any issue "as fully as justices of nisi prius in any of the United 
States may or can do."231 While the three judges were in session at 
Cincinnati in 1798, Acting Governor Sargent urged upon them the 
great need for holding a circuit court in one of the western coun-
ties, suggesting that one of the judges "should depart without more 
Delay for the Mississippi," concluding: "If there should be any 
221 Id. at 389. 
228 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 4, 1 Stat. 286. 
229 See note 153 supra. 
230 See 1 CHAsE 149; PEASE 157. 
231 For a detailed account of the Northwest nisi prius system, see Blume, Circuit 
Courts and the Nisi Prius System: The Making of an Appellate Court, 38 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 289, 295-304 (1940). 
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Doubt of the powers of a single Judge to hold a Court such may 
be readily established in our legislative Capacity."232 A nisi prius 
judge merely presided over the trial of a case commenced in the 
central court, reporting the results to the central court where 
judgment was rendered, and it may be that Sargent distinguished 
nisi prius trials from sessions of the General Court which could be 
held by one judge only in the absence of the other judges. 
Whether due to lack of means of transportation, lack of mili-
tary escort, absence of judges, doubts as to the power or ability of 
one judge to hold a court, or to absorption in other interests, the 
circuit courts were never held as scheduled. This was an "abuse" 
and the cause of much complaint. In explanation a congressional 
committee reported in 1800 that 
" ... most of the evils which they at present experience are in 
the opinion of this committee, to be imputed to the very great 
extent of country at present comprised under their imperfect 
Government. The Territory northwest of the Ohio from 
southeast to northwest [is] fifteen hundred miles, and the ac-
tual distance of travelling from the places of holding courts 
the most remote from each other is thirteen hundred miles . 
. . . In the three western counties there has been but one court 
having cognizance of crimes in five years. . . . The extreme 
necessity of judiciary attention and assistance is experienced 
in civil as well as criminal cases."233 
The committee recommended that the territory be "divided into 
two distinct and separate Governments, by a line beginning at 
the mouth of the Great Miami." Following this recommendation 
Congress created a new territory in the west-Indiana-leaving 
the Northwest government to function in the east. In 1803 the 
southern part of eastern territory became a state, the northern part 
being added to Indiana. Inhabitants of the northern part in a peti-
tion to Congress dated at Detroit, March 20, 1803, complained: 
"Experience has already taught us the ruinous conse-
quences which a procrastination in judicial proceedings, pro-
duces to Commerce; for a term of more than Six Years, whilst 
under the Government of the North Western Territory, but 
Two Superior-Courts were held in the County of Wayne; 
notwithstanding the many Actions removed into the General 
.232 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 503, 504. 
233 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 206 (class 10, Misc. 1834). 
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Court by error &ca-Several of which will remain undecided, 
altho' pending Three or Four years. The ostensible causes 
which operated to deprive us of regular and stated courts, 
whilst a part of the late Territory, must necessarily increase, 
as long as we remain attached to the Indiana, in a ratio, pro-
portionate to the increase of distance, added to the greater 
hazard, the Judges must encounter in performing a Journey 
of at least double the distance the late Judges had to travel, 
and the whole of that immense distance, thro' a continued 
Indian Country, inhabited by distinct Nations and Tribes of 
Savages, often at War amonst themselves, as well as hostile 
to travellers."234 
The Northwest nisi prius system was continued in Indiana 
by a law adopted in 1801 providing that upon any issue joined in 
the General Court, the issue should be tried in the county whence 
the cause was removed before the judges of the General Court, "or 
any one of them," as a circuit court.235 In 1807 the system was 
modified by a provision that the circuit court should render final 
judgment, and issue execution, subject to review by the General 
Court.236 These provisions, and a further provision empowering 
the superior judge on circuit "to grant and order new trials," 
changed the system from nisi prius to one-judge courts. 
As the frontier line of continuous settlement moved westward, 
and new territorial governments were established, the Northwest 
difficulties were encountered over and over again. Local courts 
held by lay judges were unsatisfactory; but how could three su-
perior judges sit in bank at all the times and places desired? 
One answer was to provide for "additional" judges; another was 
to authorize one superior judge to hold court alone, subject to 
review by the judges in bank. In Mississippi under a law passed 
in 1805, one judge could hold a superior "circuit court" subject 
to review by the three superior judges, or two of them, sitting 
as the "Supreme Court of Mississippi Territory."237 In 1804 Con-
gress provided for the appointment of an "additional" superior 
judge who was to reside "at or near the Tombigbee settlement."238 
234 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EREcnoN OF WAYNE COUNTY AND MICHIGAN 
TERRITORY 14 (1922-1923). 
235 INDIANA LAws 8. 
236 Id. at 230. 
237 Miss. Acts, 3d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. 55 (1805). See note 58 supra. 
238 Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 59, 2 Stat. 301. 
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A second "additional" judge was authorized in 1810,239 the act 
providing that judgments and decrees of the "additional" judges 
might be reviewed by the "superior court" of Adams County "com-
posed of not less than two judges." Judge Toulmin summarized 
the developments in an opinion delivered in 1815: 
"Originally there were only three judges for the Missis-
sippi Territory, who by the ordinance constituted a court, pos-
sessing common law jurisdiction. In the year 1802 the ter-
ritorial legislature divided the territory into certain districts, 
in each of which a superior court was to be held by the judges 
appointed under the ordinance:-but writs of error lay to 
each of those superior courts, from the superior court of 
Adams district. That part of the territory which lay east of 
Pearl river, and which was called the district of Washington, 
being very inconvenient to judges residing on the Mississippi; 
an additional judge for the territory was appointed under an 
act of congress passed in 1804:-and although, like the pre-
ceding ones, he was a judge for the territory at large;-it was 
made his especial duty to reside at or near the Tombigby 
settlement,-and he was vested exclusively of the other 
judges, with the same jurisdiction as had antecedently been 
exercised by them within the district of Washington."240 
An "additional" judge for Missouri (1814) was required to reside 
at or near the "village of Arkansaw."241 Doty, "additional" judge 
for Michigan, wrote in 1830: 
"On the 30th, of January 1823, an act was passed to pro-
vide for the appointment of an Additional Judge for the 
Michigan territory in the Counties of Mackinaw, Brown and 
Crawford, which embraced the whole country situated be-
tween Lakes Huron, Superior and Michigan, and the Missis-
sippi river. He was required to hold terms of the court at 
three places-the Island of Michilimackinaw, Green Bay and 
Prairie du Chien. His jurisdiction was that of the Supreme 
and County Courts, and his salary fixed at $1200. per annum. 
In performing his duties he travels thirteen hundred and 
sixty miles by water, and usually in a birch-bark canoe."242 
239 Act of March 2, 1810, ch. 16, § 2, 2 Stat. 564. 
240 6 T.ERIUTORIAL PAPERS 516, 517. 
241 Act of Jan. 27, 1914, ch. 8, 3 Stat. 95. 
242 12 T.ERIUTORIAL P .APERS 140. 
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The situation east of Lake Michigan was described by Judge 
Woodbridge in 1828: 
"Heretofore, & until recently, the Judges of this Terri-
tory were required to hold but one Term of the Court an-
nually & that in Detroit. . . . But as the country became 
more settled, new counties were organized;- and it has been 
deemed expedient to increase the number of terms, & places 
too, of holding Courts.-The Legislative Council of the Ter-
ritory, under the sanction of an Act of Congress of the 29th 
J anY 1827, have, at its late session, directed court to be holden 
in each of the organized counties of the Peninsula-& giving 
very ample jurisdiction to them, have required that all or a 
majority of the Judges attend each term.-The consequence 
of this new organization is, that the Judges, collectively, have 
now to hold fifteen Courts annually, instead of one, & to tra-
verse, mostly on horseback, an immense country, over roads 
not yet half formed &, some of which are exceedingly dan-
gerous.-The principle of this system, is progressive; the 
number of courts to be holden, will continue to increase with 
the advancing settlement of the Country."243 
As long as the superior judges of Michigan controlled the legis-
lative board, the Supreme Court sat only at Detroit. A change 
of the legislative agency was necessary to correct this "abuse."2H 
In a memorial to Congress presented in 1814, the Legislature 
of Indiana suggested the "propriety and necessity of defining, with 
more precision, the duties of the judges appointed by virtue of 
243 Letter, Woodbridge to Strong, dated Nov. 28, 1828, Woodbridge Papers, Burton 
Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit, Michigan. 
244 Objections were made to trial in Wayne County of indictments for murders 
alleged to have been committed in other counties-some of them far distant from 
Detroit. Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and 
Venue, 43 MICH. L. R.Ev. 59, 82 (1944). That this practice may have been desirable 
in a frontier territory is suggested by a Virginia statute enacted 1655-1666: "WHEREAS 
there was an act for the benefitt and ease of the people that criminal causes should be 
tryed in the counteys where the offenders committed them. ·wee conceive it no ease nor 
benefitt to the people to have their lives taken away with too much ease, And though 
we confesse the same to be done in England, yet wee know the disparity between them 
and vs to be so great that wee cannot with safety follow the example, for noe country 
there but makes at least ten times the number of people here, and the jurors there are 
more practised in criminal! causes then, by the blessing of God, wee are here, and 
have more to informe them in case they should err, And 'tis a maxim that no 
deliberation can be too much pondered that concerns the life of the meanest man; Be it 
therefore enacted, that from henceforth all criminall causes that concerne life or member 
be tryed at quarter courts before the Governour and Councill or at Assemblies (which 
of them shall first happen,) where it is probable the ablest and most impartiall men will 
meet." 1 HENNING, STATUTES AT LARGE 397 (1823). 
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the ordinance for the government of the Territory . . . as the 
ordinance creating the courts leaves it afloat, without identifying 
either the time when, the place where, or the manner how, this 
court is to exercise their jurisdiction."2• 11 The memorial detailed 
some of the difficulties which had arisen under the act of Con-
gress authorizing one judge to hold a court,246 and prayed that 
the act be repealed. In response Congress enacted in 1815: 
"That the judges of the general court of the Indiana ter-
ritory, shall, in each and every year, hold two sessions of the 
said court, at Vincennes, in the county of Knox, on the first 
Mondays of February and September; at Corydon, in the 
county of Harrison, on the third Mondays in February and 
September; and at Brookville, in the county of Franklin, on 
the first Mondays next succeeding the fourth Mondays of 
February and September, which courts respectively shall be 
composed of at least two of the judges appointed by the gov-
ernment of the United States; and no person or persons, 
acting under the authority and appointment of the said ter-
ritory, shall be associated with the said judges."247 
A week after Congress had settled the matter of court sessions 
for Indiana, a different scheme was provided for Illinois. The 
Territory was divided into three circuits, and each judge directed 
to hold court alone in the circuit allotted to him, at the times 
and places fixed by the statute.248 The judges in bank were to 
2411 ANNALS OF CONG., 13th Cong., 3d Sess. 400 (1814). 
246 "Thus, one of the judges being competent to hold a court, may decide a principle, 
or a point of law, at one term, and, at the next term, if the other two judges are present, 
they may decide the same principle or point of law different. Thus the decisions of 
the superior court, organized, we presume, by the General Government, finally to settle 
in uniformity the principles of law and fact, which may be brought before them by the 
suitor, may be, and frequently are, in a state of fluctuation; hence the rights of persons 
and property become insecure. There is another evil, growing out of the system, of one 
judge being competent to hold the superior court, or that court which forms the last 
resort of the suitor in any Government, and particularly in the Territory; for appeals 
are taken from all the court of inferior jurisdiction in the Territory, to the court 
organized by the ordinance, which inferior courts are never constituted of less than two 
judges. Thus the suitor in the Territory is frequently driven to the necessity of 
appealing from the judgment of two men to that of one; but this dilemma only 
constitutes part of the solecism for the next superior court, as the other two judges may 
overturn the principles of the decision of their brother judge at the preceding term. 
Hence the want of uniformity in the decisions of the court of the last resort. Anger 
and warmth in the suitors, and confusion in our system of jurisprudence, is the result." 
Ibid. 
247 Act of Feb. 24, 1815, ch. 54, 3 Stat. 213. 
248 Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 237, §§ 2, 3, 3 Stat. 237. 
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constitute a court of appeals. This scheme had been adopted by 
the local legislature in 1814,249 but had not become operative be-
cause of opposition by the judges. In a memorial to Congress 
dated December 21, 1814,250 the legislature, after referring to its 
conflict with the judges, stated: 
"The vast accumulation of expenses and the personal in-
convenience that would result to the people of remote and 
distant parts of the Territory by obliging them all with their 
witnesses to attend at Kaskaskia for the trial of their causes, 
if they ;would not, in many instances amount to a total denial 
of Justice, they would at least be extremely oppressive-And 
the single circumstance of their having been but one suit in-
stituted in the court of which their honors are Judges for the 
last two years, demonstrates most conclusively that some 
change was necessary. 
"The law herewith transmitted was planned with a view 
to former objections that were understood to have been made 
by the Judges, by which it appeared that they would not 
object to performing their duties of a separate Court, pro-
vided the style, and unity of their Court was nominally 
preserved. "251 
Whatever may have been their real reasons for opposing the court 
scheme of 1814, the judges were probably sincere in their desire 
to preserve the "style and unity" of their court. Though unity 
was not preserved as it would have been by a nisi prius system, 
the fact the judges assigned themselves to their individual circuits, 
and met together to review their respective judgments, made pos-
sible a degree of unity that was more than nominal. 
· This scheme of court organization, supplemented in 1836 by 
the addition of probate and justices' courts, became the standard-
ized or established system referred to above under "Judicial Sys-
tems after 1836." The difficulties and dangers of frontier travel 
had forced both Congress and the local legislatures to abandon 
ancient traditions and to seek something new. 
The chief problems remaining were to determine who should 
divide the territories into districts, assign individual judges to the 
249 17 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 50. 
250 Id. at 51. 
251 Details of this and other Illinois developments with charts of court systems will 
be found in Schuyler, The Judicial System in the Illinois Territory (1809-1818), 
Jan. 1962 (unpublished thesis in University of Michigan Law Library). 
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several districts, and fix the number, time, and place of sessions. 
That no one solution of these problems was found is indicated 
by the following digest of sections 1913-1918 of the Revised Stat-
utes, 1873-74: 
Power to divide territory into districts 
Legislature- N.M., Utah, Wash., Colo., Dakota, Ariz., 
Wyo. 
Judges - Idaho, Mont. 
Power to assign individual judges to district 
Legislature-N.M., Wash., Colo., Dakota, Ariz., Wyo. 
Judges - Idaho, Mont. 
Governor - Utah. 
Power to fix number, time, and place of sessions 
Legislature -Wash., Colo., Dakota, Wyo. 
Judges - Idaho, Mont., N.M., Ariz. 
Governor - Utah. 
An undated brochure recently circulated by the American 
Judicature Society contains views of Arthur T. Vanderbilt and 
Roscoe Pound on "Modern Unified Court Organizations." After 
pointing out that "multiplicity of courts" is characteristic of "an 
immature system of law," Vanderbilt states that "all the courts 
that any American state really needs" are three: 1. A general 
trial court with state-wide jurisdiction of every kind of case. 2. A 
local court for the trial of minor cases. 3. An appellate tribunal 
to review questions of law. Noting that very few of our states 
have achieved "this ideal of the three-court system," Vanderbilt 
observes that "the degree to which they have progressed in this 
direction is one measure of their judicial civilization." Pound 
proposes that the whole judicial power of the state be "concen-
trated in one court" made up of "three chief branches" correspond-
ing to the "three courts" recommended by Vanderbilt. He sug-
gests that the "one court" might be called "The Court of Justice" 
(another name suggested, "The General Court of Justice"). Van-
derbilt believes intermediate courts of appeal must be provided 
as needed in the larger states. Pound, on the other hand, thinks 
"it should be possible for the supreme court to sit in divisions if 
necessary for the prompt dispatch of business." Regional or local 
appellate terms of the superior court should be provided making 
unnecessary "intermediate appellate tribunals of any sort." 
"As has been suggested in other connections, the proce-
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dure at these terms could be as simple as at the old hearings 
in bank at Westminster after a trial at circuit. Three judges 
assigned to hold the term would pass on a motion for a new 
trial or judgment on or notwithstanding a verdict, or for 
modification or setting aside of findings and judgment ac-
cordingly (as at common law upon a special verdict). If, as 
I assume would be true, it proved necessary to limit the cases 
which could go thence to the supreme court, rules could re-
strict review to those taken by the highest court on cer-
tiorari. "252 
It has been said the organization of the judicial system in the 
territories 1861-1890 was "simple." 
"Under the organic acts, each territory had three justices 
appointed by the president for four-year terms. Sitting to-
gether, they constituted a supreme court; sitting separately, 
they acted as district judges. In both capacities they had 
jurisdiction over cases arising under United States or terri-
torial law; appeals went from the territorial supreme court 
to the Supreme Court of the United States."253 
Only two types of inferior courts were authorized: (1) justices' 
courts; (2) probate courts. The organization of these courts was 
left to local legislation, but with express limitations on the juris-
diction of the justices' courts and an implied limitation on the 
jurisdiction of the probate courts. 
In one respect, progress toward "judicial civilization" went 
beyond the "ideal" system outlined in the Judicature Society's 
brochure. By employing separate sessions it was found practica-
ble to concentrate in one set of superior courts both state and 
federal jurisdiction. 
Comparison of the standardized or established territorial court 
system after 1836 with that provided for Northwest commencing 
in 1787 will indicate the principal developments of the period of 
experimentation: 
1. The court system of Northwest consisted of a supreme-
general-superior court, superior circuit courts, courts of oyer and 
terminer, courts of common pleas, courts of quarter sessions, pro-
bate judges, probate courts, orphans courts, and courts of justices 
252 Undated brochure of American Judicature Society. 
253 POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES AND TiiE UNITED STATES 1861-1890-STtJDIES IN COLONIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 51 (1947). 
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of the peace. In the later system there were only four types of 
courts-supreme, superior, probate, and justice. 
2. The supreme-general-superior court of Northwest had both 
original and appellate jurisdiction. The supreme court of the 
later system was an appellate court with little or no original 
jurisdiction. 
3. The circuit system of Northwest was a true nisi prius sys-
tem under which all questions of law were decided by the judges 
sitting in bank on demurrer or motion. Under the later system 
judgments rendered on circuit by the individual judges were re-
viewed by the judges in bank on writ of error or equity appeal. 
4. All Northwest trial courts, except perhaps the nisi prius 
courts, were multiple-judge courts. The trial courts of the later 
system were held by single judges. 
5. The Northwest superior courts had a common-law juris-
diction only. The later superior courts had a chancery as well as 
a common-law jurisdiction. 
6. The Northwest courts had no federal-type jurisdiction, did 
not follow federal procedure, and there was no review by a fed-
eral appellate court. The courts of the later system had both state 
and federal jurisdiction, followed federal procedure to a limited 
extent, and were subject to federal review. 
7. The superior judges of Northwest were appointed by the 
national government to serve during good behavior. The superior 
judges of the later system were appointed in like manner for 
four-year terms. 
8. The inferior judicial officers of Northwest were appointed 
by the governor. Those of the later system might be elected. 
The governor and judges of Northwest were supposed to leg-
islate by adopting laws from the original states, and it is evident 
that Northwest's multiple-court, multiple-judge judicial system 
was pieced together by selecting features of the older systems. The 
streamlined system of the later period was the product of what 
may be called an ideal course of development-from the complex 
to the simple. This course of development was forced by the 
steady pressure of frontier conditions. Lack of local persons com-
petent to serve as judges of local multiple-judge courts made it 
necessary to send competent superior judges to the scattered com-
munities.21S4 The difficulties and dangers of frontier travel made 
25¾ Acting Governor Sargent of Northwest noted in the Executive Journal that 
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it impracticable to send benches of superior judges with satisfac-
tory frequency, or at all, and this led to the establishment of dis-
tricts in which on,e superior judge would reside, and go on circuit. 
Meetings of the superior judges to hear demurrers and motions 
and to render judgment under a nisi prius system required more 
travel than a system of review by writ of error and equity appeal. 
Impeachment of territorial judges was considered impracticable 
because of the necessity of having witnesses travel great distances 
to the seat of the national government. Appointment for short 
terms, instead of during good behavior, was a partial solution of 
the removal problem. Election, instead of appointment, of in-
ferior judges was authorized in the period of Jacksonian Democ-
racy and may be attributed to views current at the time. 
After the territorial court system had been simplified, there 
was a movement to unify and simplify superior court procedure. 
Following the lead of New York, procedure codes were enacted in 
Minnesota 1851, Oregon 1854, Washington 1854, Nebraska 1855, 
Kansas 1859, Nevada 1861, Dakota 1862, Idaho 1864, Montana 
1865, Wyoming 1869, Utah 1870, Oklahoma 1890, New Mexico 
1897.255 Most of these codes "enacted in substance, and often in 
its very letter," the New York Code of 1848.256 Of the territories 
having the standardized or established judicial system after 1848 
only Colorado failed to join the "procession of the codes."257 In 
Nebraska, "as in some' other territorial codes, a formal distinction 
between law and equity was retained."258 
difficulty in finding suitable persons for appointment to office in the new county of 
Wayne had forced him to appoint one person to more than one office. 3 TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS 454. In a letter to the Secretary of State he wrote: "Sir my Difficulties have been 
very great in selecting suitable Characters to Fill the civil Offices in this County-more 
particularly for the Court of Common Pleas .••• It will however be extremely to be 
lamented that so very few men of legal Ability or even common Education were to be 
found in the County.'' Id. at 457. In Indiana the four county courts (common pleas, 
quarter session, probate and orphans) inherited from Northwest were consolidated into 
one court of common pleas in 1805. INDIANA LAws 115. It was obviously easier to staff 
one local court than it was to find suitable judges for multiple local courts. 
255 HEPBURN, op. cit. supra note 210, at 98-111. 
256 Id. at 88. 
257 Id. at 112. 
258 Id. at 102. In the Minnesota code of 1851 "a distinct jurisdiction 'in all matters 
of chancery' was retained •..• In 1853, the court of chancery was abolished, and the 
suits and proceedings in equity were brought within the provisions of the codes, as 
'civil actions.'" Id. at 98. "In 1854 the New York code, in so far as it related to actions 
at law, was adopted, word for word, by the fifth legislative assembly of Oregon. A 
separate act was passed to regulate proceedings in equity.'' Id. at 101. Beardsley, Code 
Making in Early Oregon, 27 PACIFIC NORTHWEST Q. 20 (No. 1, reprint 1936), quotes one 
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The first constitutions of the seventeen states formed from the 
territories having the standardized or established judicial system 
provide court systems which are strikingly similar. This, bf 
course, is because all the states were building on the same terri-
torial base. In making the following summary, reference was made 
to the Kansas Constitution of 1859: 
Judicial power vested in 
Supreme Court (appellate): Iowa, Wis., Minn., Ore., Kan., 
of the code commissioners as saying: "Mr. Bigelow strongly insisted upon having no 
separate court of equity or equity proceedings, but urged that we follow the example 
of California in this respect. Mr. Boise and I differed from Mr. Bigelow. We contended 
that in the Organic Act of Aug. 14, 1848, a separate system of equity proceedings was 
contemplated, wherin it provided that 'each district court, or judge thereof shall appoint 
its clerk, who shall be the register in chancery.'" In Compiling the Territorial Codes 
of Washington, 28 PACIFIC NORTHWEST Q. 19 (No. I, reprint 1937), Beardsley writes: 
"Common to each of the territorial codes of "\Alashington from 1854 to 1869 inclusive, 
was a provision which abolished all distinctions between 'actions at law' and 'suits in 
chancery' and provided one form of action to be known as a 'civil action.' Such a statute 
had been incorporated into the laws of several of the territories created by Congress 
in the years between 1845 and 1865, and represented a liberal interpretation of that 
section of their organic acts which provided that 'The supreme court and the district 
courts, respectively, of every territory, shall possess chancery as well as common law 
jurisdiction.' These territorial legislatures construed this grant of power to mean that 
chancery and common law jurisdiction could be exercised jointly rather than severally. 
It will be recalled that under a similar section in the Organic Act of Oregon Territory 
the code commissioners of 1853 refused to make such an interpretation, notwithstanding 
the urgent plea of Commissioner Daniel R. Bigelow of Olympia, who wished then to 
combine equitable and legal relief in one proceeding. When this legislative power came 
before the United States Supreme Court for review in a case arising in Montana, the 
court held that the territorial legislature had no power to pass an act depriving the 
territorial courts 'of chancery as well as common law jurisdiction.' This decision was 
rendered on May I, 1871 . . . . As a result of this decision, the next session of the 
legislative assembly on Washington Territory, which convened on October 2, 1871, was 
forced to amend the code of civil procedure by enacting that, 'All common law forms 
of action are hereby abolished, but the distinction between actions at law and suits in 
chancery shall be preserved; . . .' One of the first matters to be considered by the 
Legislative Assembly of 1873 which convened on October 6, was the question of the 
revisions of the laws of the territory and particularly the Amendments of 1871 •••. 
When the legislative session was over the people found that the practice codes as 
embodied in the Code of 1873 were almost verbatim re-enactments of the similar codes 
in the Code of 1869. This restored to the code of civil procedure the provision which 
had abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in chancery, and which 
had substituted in place of these two forms of action-a civil action. In repealing the 
Amendments of 1871, apparently the legislature had some knowledge of the principles 
involved in the case of Hornbuckle v. Toombs-a second attempt made by the Montana 
Territorial Legislature to establish its power to provide for a 'single form of action'-
which was then pending before the United States Supreme Court . . • . Five months 
were to elapse before the decision of the court in the appeal of Hornbuckle v. Toombs 
was to be handed down. During this interval a bill had been introduced into Congress, 
on February 4, 1874, with the purpose of authorizing territorial legislative sanction of 
the principle of the 'single form of action.' " For references to this bill, and to the 
cases mentioned by Beardsley, see notes 212, 214, and 216 supra. 
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Nev., Neb., Colo., Idaho, Mont., N.D., S.D., Wash., 
Wyo., Utah, Okla., N.M. 
Superior trial courts 
District: Iowa, Minn., Kan., Nev., Neb., Colo., Idaho, 
Mont., N.D., Wyo., Utah, Okla., N.M. 
Circuit: Wis., Ore., S.D. 
Superior: Wash. 
Probate courts: Wis., Minn., Kan., Neb., Idaho, N.M. 
County courts (including probate): Ore., Colo., N.D., S.D., 
Wash., Okla. 
Justices of the peace: All the above states except Iowa and 
Ore. 
Inferior courts established by legislature: 
All the above states. 
Supreme Court held by appellate judges 
Elected from state at large: Iowa, Minn., Kan., Nev., Neb., 
Colo., Idaho, Mont., N.D., Wash., Wyo., Utah, N.M. 
Elected from specified districts: S.D., Okla. 
Supreme Court held by circuit judges: Wis., Ore. 
Superior trial courts held by one locally elected judge: 
Iowa, Wis., Minn., Ore., Kan., Nev., Colo., Idaho, Mont., 
N.D., S.D., Wyo., Utah, Okla., N.M., Wash. 
Superior trial courts held by one justice of Supreme Court: 
Neb. 
Legislative divorce prohibited: All the above states. 
In two of the three constitutions retaining the scheme of having 
the same judges sit as trial and appellate judges, provision was 
made for a change to the separate-judge system. In some of the 
constitutions professional training was made a qualification for 
judicial office. 
In the change from the territorial court system to the state 
systems the unique union of state and federal jurisdiction could 
not be continued, and new means of selecting and removing su-
perior judges had to be found. In the Wisconsin Constitutional 
Convention of 1846 the question most debated was retention of 
the partially-unified system under which superior judges tried cases 
on circuit and sat together as a court of review.259 Territorial ex-
perience was referred to in support of arguments for and against 
the system. Another matter debated at length was whether su-
259 QUAIFE, THE CONVENTION OF 1846, at 286-87, 495-99, 501-06 (1918). 
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perior judges should be elected or appointed, and for how long.260 
Whether separate probate courts should be retained was debated 
in the Constitutional Convention of 1847-48.261 
The chief argument in favor of retaining the partially-unified 
system was a strong belief that appellate judges wholly divorced 
from trial work would become mere "parchment" judges, and 
would rust out. They would lose touch with juries, and not know 
what the people were thinking. The people would not know 
them. Furthermore, they would be expensive and idle most of 
the time. In the combined system young men could be used who 
would gain through trial work the experience needed for appel-
late work. Their appellate experience would aid them in their 
trial work. Older men with the trial experience necessary for 
appellate work only would not be available. One argument against 
retaining the partially-unified system was the practical one of fore-
seeing a time when growth of population would make the dual 
role too burdensome. The chief argument, however, was not based 
on predictions of what might happen, but on past experience. 
There had been strong suspicions, if not positive proof, of judicial 
"log rolling." These suspicions were not limited to Wisconsin. 
In a study of colonial administration, Pomeroy states: 
"The number of judges in a territory significantly affected 
the development of the higher and still more of the lower 
territorial judiciary. No increases above the usual three come 
until after 1879; during the eighties Dakota reached as many 
as eight judges, and Washington, Montana, Utah, and New 
Mexico totals of five each. These additions made it possible 
to provide, after 1884, that no judge of the territories affected 
should sit in appeal in cases he had decided in district court. 
This limitation was a gesture to an old grievance. Where a 
judge had to review his own decisions, there was necessarily 
'suspicion of collusion among the judges to sustain the opin-
ions of each other in the courts below.' Charges of log-rolling 
were such that the Supreme Court of Arizona was referred 
to as the 'Supreme Court of Affirmance.' 'Unless there is some 
change,' wrote a Montana attorney, 'it would be better . 
to simply have mining or Justices courts.' "262 
260 Id. at 287-91, 587-89, 591-603. 
201 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTlTUTION FOR TIIE STATE OF 
WISCONSIN 370-75 (1848). 
262 POMEROY, TIIE TERRITORIES AND THE UNITED STATES 1861-1890, at 52-53 (1947). 
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Territorial judges of the standardized or established system 
had been appointed by the President of the United States with the 
consent of the Senate. This method of selection no longer avail-
able, what should take its place? The three most obvious substi-
tutes were: appointment by the governor with the consent of the 
state senate; appointment or election by the state legislature; elec-
tion by the people. Statehood meant freedom from colonial rule, 
and there was no more inclination to have strong state governors in 
states formed from territories than there had been in states formed 
from the original colonies. Jacksonian Democracy may be praised 
or condemned for the decision to elect all judges by popular vote. 
Though at one time territorial judges were appointed to serve 
during good behavior, those of the later system were appointed 
for four-year terms. Similar terms were provided for the elected 
judges of the states. 
The territorial probate courts were specialized courts. Whether 
they should be retained or changed to county courts with enlarged 
jurisdiction was much debated. As shown by the above digest, 
the first constitutions of the states referred to divided equally on 
this question. 
In the development of our third judicial system, and in it~ 
transmission to the newly-formed states, there was increasing ne-
glect of one of the two functions of appellate review as set out in 
the congressional report of 1803. Under the nisi prius system both 
functions (uniformity of decision and correctness of decision) were 
served without favoring one as against the other. Under the circuit 
system emphasis was put on the function of settling the law. But 
as long as the same persons served as both trial and appellate 
judges, interest in seeing that justice had been done in particular 
cases was not lost. When the appellate courts began to be staffed 
with separate judges, the function of unifying and settling the 
law became the favored one; the other, an unwelcome chore. To 
restore the neglected function to its original vigor, power to re-
view for this purpose should be vested in benches of trial judges 
to be exercised, as Pound recommends, in the original nisi prius 
manner. 
Continuing, Pomeroy gives other instances of popular discontent, concluding: "The 
judicial system was one of the weakest parts of the territorial institution." Id. at 61. 
He refers to the fact that "territorial judges were selected with no more deference to 
local feeling than territorial governors and secretaries." Ibid. Persons chafing under 
a tight colonial system, however well designed, are prone to find fault. 
